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ABSTRACT
Optical networks have played a major role in allowing us to meet the bandwidth
demands driven by the explosive growth of the Internet. As more and more
bandwidth-hungry applications emerge, the aggregated traﬃc at the backbone
layer will continue to grow. This increase in capacity poses challenges, especially
in terms of reliability and overall management overhead. At the same time, the
high bandwidth available in backbone networks lead to an increase in vulnerability
to failures as huge amounts of data can be lost in a relatively short period of time.
In order to meet the bandwidth demand as well as the performance requirements
of future network services, cost-eﬀective solutions that guarantee a desired level of
reliability at the core must be provided. To this end, understanding the limitations
of various survivability algorithms and protocols is important.
Given the cost of physically modifying the backbone, as well as the relatively
slow speed at which core architectures change compared to higher layers, it is im-
portant to be able to optimize the network using soft solutions to achieve better
performance. A few important aspects of network reliability and failure manage-
ment are studied in this thesis. First, a study on the impact of multiple failures
and techniques for addressing such failures are presented. Second, service diﬀer-
entiation based on reliability needs is studied. Service diﬀerentiation is critical in
balancing network operation costs as well as in maximizing network utilization.
Third, a cost-eﬃcient, high-speed recovery scheme is introduced and evaluated
under online non-dynamic and dynamic scenarios, as well as static provisioning
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applicable to protecting mission-critical traﬃc. Finally, the impact of physical
layer impairments on network reliability is presented.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Rapid advances and widespread use of high bandwidth networks, as well as mo-
bile/ubiquitous services, are constantly reshaping the way we access information
and leading to development of many new applications. As evidenced by the ex-
plosive growth of data traﬃc in recent years, as more and more network systems
are deployed to meet the needs of emerging applications, the amount of data ag-
gregated at the core infrastructure will continue to increase at an alarming rate.
In order to meet the bandwidth demand as well as the performance requirements
of future network services, the core network architectures must also evolve. Man-
agement complexity will also grow as a result, necessitating scalable management
techniques that are more eﬃcient. Thus far, optical networks have allowed us
to keep up with the bandwidth demands (currently, systems have been demon-
strated the capability to support over one hundred wavelength-channels at as high
as 80Gbps per channel over a single optical ﬁber). However, the current core ar-
chitectures exhibit many shortcomings in terms of performance and ﬂexibility.
Many important issues in cross-layer design, management and integration of next
generation optical networks need to be carefully studied in order to better support
future communication needs. To this end, examining the performance tradeoﬀs
in cost, reliability and management overhead is critical.
One of the most critical issues in designing and managing optical backbone
networks is reliability. While allowing us to support an unprecedented amount
of data traﬃc, the high data rates exacerbates the impact of failures. A huge
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amount of data and revenue can be lost in a short amount of time in the event
of a failure. For example, in a system supporting 32 40Gbps channels in each
direction on an optical ﬁber, a down time of mere 1 second of down time results
in a loss of over 2.5Tb of data. Therefore, it is important to understand the impact
of diﬀerent types of failures and provide eﬃcient solutions to address them. In
this work, several important aspects of managing optical networks are addressed
with a focus on reliability.
First, we provide an insight into how backbone networks need to be managed
as they become more heterogeneous, providing services for applications (or higher
layer networks) with diverse reliability needs. Given that minimizing capacity
cost (measured in the number of wavelength-channels provisioned in the network)
is critical in eﬃcient management of a network, various recovery techniques that
vary in cost and recovery-speed can be utilized to serve the varying needs of
diﬀerent classes of traﬃc.
Second, we study the impact of multiple failures on networks designed with
single failure recovery mechanisms. We introduce new metrics that can be used
to quantify the impact of multiple failures and measure how well traditional ap-
proaches perform under multiple failures. We then propose a combination of
management techniques technique, based on a small amount of preplanning and
quick post-failure reconﬁguration, that allow a network to gracefully degrade un-
der such failures.
Third, we design a cost-eﬃcient network protection algorithm and protocol,
called Streams, with the goal of rapid recovery. Using Streams, we showed that
cost-eﬃcient end-to-end protection can be achieved without sacriﬁcing recovery
speed. Prior to our approach, utilization of end-to-end protection schemes always
resulted in penalty in recovery speed or cost overhead. We evaluate the perfor-
mance of the Streams protection scheme under online non-dynamic and dynamic
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routing scenarios and compare the results with the fastest recovery scheme as
well as the most cost-eﬃcient recovery scheme. We also show that the Streams
protection scheme can be used to design protected core networks for high-priority
connections using static, oﬄine provisioning. We propose a novel optimization
technique using integer linear programming based on a novel heuristic that al-
lows us to eﬀectively reduce the problem space. Finally, we quantify the impact
of physical layer impairments on reliability of all-optical networks. We evaluate
quality of transmission (QoT) aware routing algorithms with end-to-end protec-
tion, and quantify the overhead in guaranteeing 100% survivability under trans-
mission impairments. We also quantify the performance of best-eﬀort approaches
and show that its application depends heavily on the topology of the network.
Using simulation with detailed models of physical layer components, we also draw
a comparison between using a hardware-based approach (additional hardware is
used to overcome some of the problem with signal crosstalk) and a “soft” solution
based on smarter routing techniques.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: First, a discussion of various
failure models in optical networks as well as a survey of previous work are provided.
The topic of multiple failure management is presented in detail in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 covers reliability-diﬀerentiated protection along with an optimization
technique that can be used in wavelength routed multi-class networks. In Chapter
4, we present a high-speed recovery algorithm called Streams. In Chapter 5, we
present a study on the impact of physical layer impairments (caused by imperfect
characteristics of network components such as ampliﬁers and switch fabrics) on
network reliability in the context of optically transparent networks. Finally, a
summary and discussion of future directions is provided in Chapter 6.
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1.1 Reliability in Optical Networks
Various failure models are used to study the impact of network failures, as well
as in designing eﬃcient management techniques to address the failures. In this
chapter, I ﬁrst provide a brief overview of the common failure models that are
used throughout this work. I then present a short survey of the previous work in
optical network survivability.
1.2 Failure Models
General failure modes in optical networks consist of channel failures, link failures,
and failures of optical crossconnects (OXCs). Channel failures are the most com-
mon, and are often caused by the failure of a line card or cards at a port of a
switching node. Network connections utilizing a failed channel become discon-
nected, and the higher layer networks or applications start to lose data. Higher
layer networks or protocols, such as the well-known Internet Protocol (IP), may
have fault-resilience built into them. However, failures at the backbone level can
leave networks physically disconnected, rendering higher-layer protocols helpless.
Link failures are also common, and lead to failure of all channels on all ﬁbers
in the link. Some of the most common causes for link failures include ampliﬁer
failures, ﬁber cuts caused by wayward backhoes and switch port failures. Most
of the work in the area of network survivability focus on link failures as the same
protocols and algorithms can be used to handle channel failures. The underlying
assumption here is that the failures are detected/initiated by the end nodes on a
per-channel basis. There are ﬁber-based failure detection and recovery initiation
protocols ( discussed in the next section), but most such schemes do not allow
eﬃcient use of network resources in multi-channel WDM networks.
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Network nodes, which consist of optical crossconnects (OXC) for networks
that utilize optical-electronic-optical conversion (OEO) or photonic crossconnects
(PXT) for networks that utilize all-optical components, can also fail. Complete
node failures, caused by hardware failures, power outages, malicious attacks, etc.,
are much less common, but can cause a much more severe problem as all network
links and channels that originate, pass through, or terminate at the failed node
go down at the same time. This type of failure leaves the network in a much more
vulnerable state given that it is equivalent to several links failing at the same
time. Given the relatively small size of the network topologies at the WDM layer,
removing several links leaves the network heavily disconnected. Recovery from
complete node failures for traﬃc originating or terminating at the failed node
requires the use of hardware redundancy where the entire node is duplicated, but
networks are seldom built to this level of reliability. However, one interesting thing
to note is that it is easier to replace failed switches or parts of the failed node
compared to a ﬁber that has been cut. Depending on the type of the problem,
link failures can take longer to physically repair.
Due to the small probability of multiple failures, and to minimize the network
resources that need to be reserved to handle failures (overhead), survivability
schemes are usually designed to handle single failures. However, the ability to
degrade gracefully in the event of multiple network failures is important in meeting
the goals of the design and management of reliable networks. The signiﬁcance
of multiple failure models is that they can be used to understand the impact
of failures that can not be captured using single failure models [1, 2], thereby
allowing us to quantify the network’s ability to achieve graceful degradation as
well as allowing us to design better management techniques.
Multiple failures can be separated into two categories, diﬀerentiated by the
temporal relationship between failures. Simultaneous failures refer to cases where
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multiple components fail close enough in time to disrupt normal recovery (in
networks designed to handle only single failures). It is highly unlikely to have two
independent failures fall within the general recovery time goal for rapid recovery,
which is in the order of 100ms or less. We discuss the recovery timing in the next
section. However, a network may experience another type of simultaneous failures,
called shared risk link group failure (SRLG), such as a cut through a conduit
shared by several topologically diverse links. SRLGs require special attention
as all links in the SRLG fail in the event that SRLGs take place. Generally,
SRLGs are hard to handle without the information on their location, and pose
complicated management issues. Often, SRLG detection is diﬃcult in itself [3].
On the other hand, if SRLG information is given, diﬀerent provisioning techniques
can be used to avoid SRLG failures from disrupting connections for long periods
of time. The provisioning method is eﬀective (again, given SRLG information)
in preventing such failures from ever occurring, but is much more constrained in
route selection and optimization and poses a big challenge [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. SRLG
issues are not covered in this thesis as the techniques presented in the literature
are orthogonal to the various methods of survivability techniques described in this
work, and therefore can be used together.
Sequential failures are failures of multiple components separated by enough
time for the recovery algorithm to complete recovery of a single failure, but be-
fore this failure can be physically replaced or repaired. For many rapid recovery
schemes, recovery times are on the order of milliseconds (typically 20 to 100 mil-
liseconds [9]) in the optical layer, whereas physical repair of failed components
may take several hours to days/weeks. It is easy to see that the networks are ex-
posed to subsequent failures while waiting for physical repairs to happen. Given
the relative time scales for the recovery protocol and waiting for physical repair
to take place, sequential failures are much more likely to occur compared to si-
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Figure 1.1: Basic taxonomy of survivability schemes.
multaneous failures. Due to the fact that it is much more likely to occur than
simultaneous failures, sequential failures have been previously used to study the
impact of multiple failures in [1, 2].
1.3 Failure Management
To protect the networks from failures discussed in the previous section, various
recovery techniques have been proposed in the past. The key tradeoﬀs amongst
these techniques are recovery-speed, the cost (deﬁned as the amount of extra net-
work capacity required to implement a particular recovery scheme), management
overhead and compatibility (in terms of special hardware use). In this section, a
brief survey of the previous work in the literature and examples that explain an
intuitive classiﬁcation of recovery schemes are presented.
A general taxonomy of survivability schemes is shown in Figure 1.1. In gen-
eral, survivability schemes are classiﬁed into two main categories—Protection and
Restoration—in [10]. Restoration locates free wavelength-channels (λ-channels)
for backup after a failure occurs, and therefore requires minimal amount of extra
capacity to be reserved for backup. Protection preplans backup routes that are
used in the event of a failure. Protection and restoration oﬀer a tradeoﬀ between
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the speed of recovery and eﬃciency in terms of the use of spare capacity [11, 12].
Restoration schemes are more eﬃcient in terms of capacity requirements, and oﬀer
better multiple failure survivability because they dynamically ﬁnd backup paths
after a failure. However, protection can also be implemented in a capacity eﬃcient
manner [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] and oﬀer much faster recovery with the ab-
sence of the excess signaling delay needed for dynamic route discovery [20, 21, 22].
Restoration based recovery takes about 2 seconds (time spent searching for new
routes as well as connection re-establishment), whereas protection schemes can
achieve complete recovery in the order of tens of milliseconds [23]. For example,
Synchronous Optical Networks (SONET) have a 50ms protection switching ca-
pability and falls under protection. As many of the networks are built on top of
SONET and have become dependent on reliable operation with rapid-recovery,
protection schemes are assumed for this work. It is also important to note that
rapid recovery schemes will becomes increasingly important as we become more
and more dependent on reliable operation of underlying communication networks.
Protection algorithms can be further classiﬁed into local (link) protection and
path (end-to-end) protection. Path protection requires selection of disjoint pri-
mary and backup path pairs. In 1+1 (one-plus-one) protection, traﬃc is actively
sent on both paths, and the receiving node simply switches to the backup path in
the event of a failure [23]. This type of protection oﬀers fast recovery with little or
no data loss because no signaling is required between the source and the destina-
tion nodes, but is ineﬃcient in terms of capacity requirements. It is also expensive
to actively drive two live paths for every connection. With 1:1 protection, dedi-
cated backup channels are also reserved for each primary channel, but the backup
path does not carry live traﬃc until there is a failure. The backup paths are then
capable of carrying additional unprotected (and preemptible) traﬃc. This reuse
makes 1:1 even more eﬃcient than 1+1 protection in terms of capacity utiliza-
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tion; the tradeoﬀ is the additional delay before the traﬃc is switched onto the
backup path, which increases the recovery time compared to the 1+1 approach.
These end-to-end protection schemes are refereed to as dedicated path protection
(DPP). However, 1:1 is assumed in this work due to operation costs. Even though
recovery times are slower, the amount of data loss between 1+1 and 1:1 is the
same. I provide a discussion on the recovery timing later in this section.
In shared end-to-end protection schemes, called shared path protection (SPP),
backup channels are chosen in advance, but not preconﬁgured. Instead, the end
nodes of a lightpath signal the intermediate nodes to establish the backup route
after a failure occurs. Capacity reserved for backup can be shared among diﬀerent
connections that do not share nodes or links in their primary paths (hence cannot
fail at the same under the single failure assumption), or can be used to carry low
priority (unprotected) traﬃc, which is preempted in the event of a failure. The
need to signal and conﬁgure intermediate nodes renders SPP slow compared to
DPP, but SPP requires the least amount of reserved capacity.
Link protection schemes react more quickly to failures than do path protection
schemes since failures are detected by the end-nodes of the failed link rather
than the end-nodes of the entire path. Recovery is also initiated by the same
nodes. The diﬀerence between dedicated protection and shared protection for link
protection schemes is the same as the diﬀerence between DPP and SPP described
above. Dedicated link protection (DLP) is very similar to DPP except for the
failure detection and recovery initiation procedure. Many shared link protection
(SLP) schemes are similar to shared path protection in the sense that backup
capacity is reserved but not preconﬁgured. The nodes at the end of the failed
link signal and conﬁgure the intermediate nodes after the failure. The drawback
is that link protection is signiﬁcantly less eﬃcient than path protection in terms
of capacity usage as more capacity needs to be reserved for backup [16, 18, 24].
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Figure 1.2: Illustration of diﬀerent protection approaches.
Some protection schemes oﬀer a balance between capacity and recovery speed of
the link and path approaches by dividing up the path protection approach into a
number of domains (or segments) [25, 26].
Figure 1.2 illustrates the four general protection schemes. All four examples
show two routed connections from node a to node d. We denote the paths p1
([a-b-c-d]) and p2 ([a-g-h-d]). In DPP, p1 and p2 share the same recovery route [a-
e-f -d], but separate wavelengths are reserved. In SPP, p1 and p2 share both the
recovery route and a backup wavelength channel. DLP and SLP protects each
individual link along the primary path using separate recovery routes. Link [a,b] is
protected by path [a-e-b] (Similarly-[b,c]–[b-e-f -c], [c,d]–[c-f -d], [a,g]–[a-e-g], [g,h]–
[g-e-f -h], [h,d]–[h-f -d]). DLP pre-allocates separate wavelength channels for use
by recovery routes, whereas SLP allows sharing of wavelengths channels to better
optimize capacity usage.
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The importance of these four protection schemes is that they capture the
characteristics of most protection algorithms found in the literature. For example,
DLP based on selecting shortest recovery paths possible for each link provides the
fastest recovery among all protection algorithms, including mesh protection [10,
15, 19], generalized loopback [27], p-cycles [28], ring-based schemes such as cycle
double covers [29], and other protection methods that attempt to oﬀer advantages
of both PP and LP [25, 26]. On the other hand, SPP is considered the most
capacity-eﬃcient protection algorithm [9].
Some of the speciﬁc examples of rapid recovery schemes include the use of log-
ical ring embeddings in a mesh network. Protection schemes that use rings, such
as cycle double covers [29], provide rapid recovery through the use of Automatic
Protection Switching (APS), which automatically switches traﬃc over to protec-
tion ﬁbers in the event of a failure. Ring-based solutions, however, pose diﬃcult
optimization problems of ﬁnding ring covers, and do not guarantee 100% connec-
tivity between all pairs of nodes with protection against node failures [30] without
complex extensions to enable backup paths to hop between rings. They are also
ineﬃcient in terms of protection capacity, requiring between 100% and 300% ad-
ditional capacity [28]. The p-cycles work [28] solves the capacity problem for rings
while providing fast recovery, using preconﬁgured cycles to protect against failures
of links in both existing and newly designed networks. Flow p-cycles [31] extends
the concept of p-cycles to path segments and provides protection for both link and
node failures. The ﬂow p-cycles algorithm is more capacity-eﬃcient compared to
the p-cycles as claimed in [31]. Both p-cycles and ﬂow p-cycles leverage hop-to-
hop OEO conversion. P-cycle conﬁgurations for networks with partial wavelength
conversion has also been studied [32]. Generalized loopback uses a ﬂooding-based
approach to provide link protection, giving a more ﬂexible and eﬃcient implemen-
tation than many ring algorithms while providing rapid, APS-like recovery [27].
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As with many link protection schemes, generalized loopback decouples primary
routing from protection allocation, and performs well when link loads are fairly
uniform. With non-uniform link loading, however, generalized loopback requires
substantially more protection capacity.
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CHAPTER 2
Multiple Failure Management
The number of critical applications that depend on reliable operation of backbone
networks are increasing, necessitating methods that allow the networks to main-
tain a high level of robustness. As both the size and complexity of these networks
continue to increase, the ability to gracefully degrade in the event of a failure be-
comes important. To this end, addressing multiple failure survivability is critical.
As discussed in the previous chapter, there are many survivability techniques that
oﬀer tradeoﬀs between recovery speed, protection capacity, and management over-
head and complexity. Most of these techniques, however, focus on single failure
models. In order to maximize the robustness of a network, and to allow graceful
degradation, multiple failure models must be considered. Recently, the interest
in understanding such failures and studying eﬃcient methods of addressing them
has been increasing [1, 2, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46].
In this chapter, techniques for maximizing the robustness of a network under
sequential failures are presented. First, based on some basic failure models, a sim-
ple classiﬁcation scheme for multiple failure management techniques is introduced.
Then, an algorithm that allows for a selection of maximally robust working and
protection path pairs is presented. An algorithm that separates out poor routing
choices is also presented and a discussion on the importance of assigning robust
paths during the initial provisioning stage is provided. These two techniques,
combined with protection reconﬁguration, allows us to meet the goal of designing
a scheme that eﬃciently protects the network against sequential failures.
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A greedy heuristic is utilized to perform dynamic protection reconfiguration
(DPR) to achieve fast reconﬁguration of recovery routes and re-allocate backup
wavelengths after a failure (online) to allow better recoverability from subsequent
failures. An ILP solution is formulated to understand the optimal (minimum)
cost. Reconﬁguration in general is an eﬃcient way to address sequential failures
as the capacity needed to reallocate the connections that are aﬀected by the initial
failure is relatively small. Previous studies have looked at handling reconﬁguration
in a way that allows the network to recover from subsequent failures only if there
is a fully disjoint path available for aﬀected connections. Some have also focused
speciﬁcally on double-link failure models (speciﬁcally, preplanning for double-link
failures). Because many networks found in practice are not very well connected
(most are two-link connected but not three-link connected), these approaches
leave many connections unprotected between recovery from the ﬁrst failure and
the time when physical repair is made. Using the techniques presented in this
chapter, a network can be made more robust; in practice, the robustness is limited
by the topology and should not be hindered by poor routing choices or failure
management techniques
Management techniques that are used together to achieve the maximum ro-
bustness for a given topology are presented. First, we introduce a ﬁltering algo-
rithm that eliminates poor primary and backup path pair choices that prevent
optimal reconﬁguration. We then propose the use of what we term minimally
overlapping paths (MOP) for protection reconﬁguration after failure. Using the
ﬁltering algorithm and MOP selection along with multiple failure management
schemes (we focus on reconﬁguration, but applicable to pre-allocation schemes as
well) guarantees maximum robustness under sequential multiple failures. Under-
standing failure dynamics with a detailed study using probabilistic models for link
failures is also important and can be found in [47, 48]. The scope of this work is
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1+N Pre-allocation
Static
Reconﬁguration
Dynamic
Reconﬁguration
RWA Oﬄine
Online w/
online reoptimization
Online
Complexity High (ILP)
Moderate (heuristic)
to High (ILP)
Low
(fast heuristic)
Capacity Cost
High
(1+N paths)
Moderate
(2 paths+Δ)
Low (∼2 paths)
Management
Overhead
Low Low to moderate Moderate
Table 2.1: Multiple Failure Management Schemes Using Protection Algorithms.
diﬀerent and is in designing eﬃcient techniques to manage/handle such failures
when they occur. We address the need for simple and eﬀective mechanisms.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section pro-
vides an outline of multiple-failure management schemes. In Section 2.2, we
present the techniques that can be used to maximize network robustness, and
provide a simple, greedy heuristic as well as an integer linear programming (ILP)
solution for DPR. We then discuss the experimental setup and present the results
from simulation runs in Section 2.2. A short summary is provided in Section 2.4.
2.1 Multiple Failure Management Paradigm
To study multiple failures, we consider sequential two-link failures. A two-link
failure consists of two independent link failures in a network graph. As deﬁned in
the previous chapter, the second failure occurs long enough after the ﬁrst to allow
normal recovery to complete but before any physical repair can be accomplished.
The two-link failure model eﬀectively captures the characteristics of sequential
failures, and aids in understanding some of the important issues in multiple failure
survivability. It also allows us to understand the eﬀect of general multiple failures
on a network rather than to simply study a speciﬁc, two link failure scenarios. For
example, considering recovery between two sequential link failures can be used to
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think about what happens between the second and the third failures under three-
link failures. Thus, it is important to keep in mind that the ideas and ﬁndings
presented in this work are not limited to two-link failures, and can be applied to
any number of sequential failures in general. However, the probability of network
partitioning increases steeply with more than two failures.
We classify multiple failure management schemes based on protection algo-
rithms into three categories—1+N pre-allocation, static reconﬁguration, and dy-
namic reconﬁguration. Table 1 summarizes the tradeoﬀs between the diﬀerent
classes of schemes. 1+N pre-allocation (oﬄine multiple failure protection plan-
ning) techniques pre-allocate backup wavelengths using precomputed recovery
routes based on a static traﬃc demand. The remaining two classes of algorithms
fall under reconfiguration. Reconﬁguration refers to multiple failure protection
management schemes that rearrange/reallocate protection resources after a fail-
ure occurs, so that additional failures can be handled. Static Reconﬁguration
performs optimization and allocation of these extra recovery paths online at the
time of provisioning. Protection resources can be reoptimized each time a new con-
nection arrives for better resource utilization, but it can introduce a considerable
amount of management complexity as a diﬃcult optimization problem may need
to be solved frequently. To the best of our knowledge, online multiple failure pro-
tection planning has not been studied. Dynamic protection reconﬁguration adapts
dynamically to failures by computing and allocation resources for new recovery
routes (in preparation for a second failure) after a failure occurs and is recovered
by the original protection scheme (only for the connections that were aﬀected by
a failure). We next present a more detailed discussion oﬀ these schemes.
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2.1.1 1+N Pre-allocation
Pre-allocation involves setting up 1+N diverse paths (where N is the number of
failures that the network must handle) and assigning wavelengths for all connec-
tions. One drawback of preplanning is that it can only be used to protect against
a ﬁxed number of failures. For example, to survive a failure of up to three links,
three protection paths must be provisioned. This scheme best supports static traf-
ﬁc, and thus allows for oﬄine capacity optimization of routing and wavelength
assignment (RWA) [35, 34, 33].
Integer Linear Programming (ILP) approaches are most commonly used to
optimize for capacity, but often are slow for large networks. Full optimization
may not be possible for many practical networks as the complexity of optimiza-
tion problems grows exponentially with the size of the network and the demand
as well as a change in N. This problem is not a shortcoming of the 1+N Pre-
allocation technique, but a challenge in complex optimization problems in general.
The optimization process, however, does not pose a serious problem in terms of
management overhead, as it is performed only once for the network. Heuristics,
such as genetic algorithms and simulated annealing, can be used, but designing
eﬃcient heuristics may also be diﬃcult. Protection capacity requirement is high
for pre-allocation. Existing techniques have focused on optimizing capacity for
double link failures and require signiﬁcantly more capacity compared to the cost
for routing working paths (over 200% capacity) [33, 35, 38, 41].
2.1.2 Static Reconﬁguration
In static reconﬁguration, two diverse paths are computed and allocated for each
connection (one for primary and the other for backup), and some buﬀer wave-
lengths are reserved based on a computation of all possible two-failure scenarios.
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Capacity cost therefore takes into account wavelengths required for allocating the
two paths plus some extra (buﬀer wavelengths, Δ) as shown in Table 1. Optimiza-
tion for RWA can be done using ILP or other heuristics depending on the network
requirements. In the event of a failure, after the initially aﬀected connections are
recovered, the network is reconﬁgured according to the precomputed second failure
scenario using the buﬀer wavelengths. Management can then choose to reiterate
the buﬀer computation and reservation process in order to support recovery from
additional failures. During this reoptimization process, either ILP or some heuris-
tic can be used again. Capacity cost is lower compared to pre-allocation, but still
may be expensive depending on the eﬃciency of the optimization technique used.
Static reconﬁguration schemes are useful especially for networks that are built on
leased lines with service agreements for a speciﬁc number of λ-channels (wave-
length channels). For these networks, it may not be possible to quickly ask for
and obtain additional λ-channels or ﬁbers from the main network, necessitating
the pre-allocation of the buﬀer wavelengths. To the best of our knowledge, no
static reconﬁguration allocation algorithm has been designed yet.
2.1.3 Dynamic Reconﬁguration
Since most protection schemes are designed to handle one failure at a time, they
can be extended to handle sequential failures using dynamic reconﬁguration. In
the event of a failure, dynamic reconﬁguration identiﬁes and protects the failed
connections and the connections that are left vulnerable to additional failures.
Reconﬁguration information is then dynamically computed. Because the network
dynamically adapts to a speciﬁc failure, dynamic reconﬁguration can handle an
arbitrary number of sequential failures (as long as the topology permits), and
requires little additional capacity. It is important to understand that capacity
18
(1)
(2)
B
A
E
C
D
F
B
A
E
C
D
F
B
A
E
C
D
F
B
A
E
C
D
F
B
A
E
C
D
F
Figure 2.1: Example of two diﬀerent failure classes shown on the FunLim graph.
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Figure 2.2: Minimally overlapping path selection. After a link failure ((A,D)) and
reconﬁguration, the connection is left vulnerable only to failure of link (A,B).
utilization of dynamic reconﬁguration can be at least as good as other schemes
because dynamic reconﬁguration only uses resources that are required to address
a speciﬁc failure to maximize the robustness of a network.
2.2 Supporting Graceful Degradation
In order to achieve maximum robustness for a given network, we consider MOPs
(minimally overlapping paths), where the number of overlapped links between
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The goal is to ﬁnd a protection path Pb that has a minimal overlap with the
working path Pw. Use any weighted shortest path algorithm with link cost cl
deﬁned as follows for each link l ∈ E:
cl =
{ |N | if l ∈ Pw
1 otherwise
If the λ-channel sharing is considered during the path search step,
the cost is deﬁned as follows:
cl =
⎧⎨
⎩
|N | if l ∈ Pw
0 if the λ-channel can be shared
1 otherwise
Figure 2.3: Simple algorithm for computing minimally overlapping paths. This
algorithm is optimal for ﬁnding a backup path that has the minimal cost among
maximally robust paths. Complexity for this algorithm using isO(|E|+|N |log|N |)
(same as Dijkstra’s algorithm).
the live path and the backup path is minimized. Given a primary path p, a min-
imally overlapping (backup) path b is a path that shares the fewest number of
links with p and has the same end points as p. Assuming a completely disjoint
path (CDP) (or non-overlapping paths) c exists for p, c is then an MOP for p
as well. However, in considering two-link failures, because many mesh networks
are not three-connected, CDP triples do not exist for many end node pairs. For
these connections, reconﬁguration will be unsuccessful, leaving them completely
vulnerable to additional failures. However, any multiple failure combination that
does not leave the two end nodes physically disconnected can be partially pro-
tected by using MOPs that are not CDPs. Note the two diﬀerent types of failures
shown in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.1(1) shows examples of disconnection failures,
where parts of the network become physically disconnected. No recovery tech-
nique can address this type of failure and thus the failure is termed fundamental
failure. Figure 2.1(2) shows two examples of non-interruptable failures. Non-
interruptable failures occur when the network has enough capacity to provide two
disjoint paths, but due to the fact that the path carrying live traﬃc cannot be
reconﬁgured (without causing service disruption), post-failure network reconﬁg-
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Routing − Upon arrival of a connection
request, cheapest primary and backup path
pair is assigned using the information saved
during the network design step.
Online Provisioning
Network Setup Stage
Operational Stage
connection request link failure
backup path pairs (for all end node
combinations) are precomputed using our
filtering algorithm (a*).
This step is performed only once for a 
given network topology and the results are
stored in a database.
Network Design − Robust primary and
Dynamic Protection Reconfiguration −
If there is a link failure, our DPR scheme (b*)
is used with MOP selection (c*).
Figure 2.4: Reconﬁguration scheme overview. (a*)Figure 2.6. (b*)Figure 2.10.
(c*)Figure 2.3.
uration is prevented. Figure 2.2 illustrates MOP selection. Going back to the
same example graph, it is easy to see that we cannot avoid non-interruptible fail-
ures. However, by using the MOP alternative, we can protect the network against
failures of links other than (A,B).
2.2.1 Minimally Overlapping Path Selection
Utilizing our ﬁltering technique (Section 2.2.4) along with MOPs in reconﬁgura-
tion allows the network to achieve maximum robustness under the given failure
model and topology for protection schemes. In other words, other than funda-
mental failures, the networks are only subject to non-interruptible failures. Non-
interruptible failures are extremely rare. The algorithm for computing MOPs is
simple and is outlined in Figure 2.3. This algorithm works with a chosen primary
path to ﬁnd a shortest MOP backup for that primary. Figure 2.4 illustrates how
our techniques ﬁt together in managing and operating a network. During the
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network setup and design stage, our ﬁltering technique is used. Again, this step is
done only once unless there is topological change. Once the network goes online,
our overall scheme only aﬀects network operation in that primary and backup
path pair selection is done from the database obtained during the network de-
sign stage using our ﬁltering algorithm. Our ﬁltering algorithm only saves robust
primary-backup pairs and, therefore, the number of choices is reduced, speeding
up route selection during online computation (over not using our method). When
there is a failure, our DPR technique is used along with MOP selection to provide
maximum robustness for the network.
Note that the ﬁltering algorithm (Section 2.2.4) is run just once at the initial
provisioning stage of the network and dynamic reconﬁguration (Figure 2.10) is
performed when there is a failure. MOP selection algorithm replaces any algo-
rithm that can be used to ﬁnd shortest disjoint paths upon reconﬁguration, and is
run for each connection that requires a new backup path during reconﬁguration.
The complexity of the ﬁltering technique is the least important as it is performed
just once for a network topology. Second, the complexity of the reconﬁguration
algorithm depends on the network load (especially in terms of the number of con-
nections that are aﬀected by a failure) and is bounded by the maximum capacity
on a link (because this ﬁgure is the maximum possible number of connections that
can go down when a link fails). Finally, the MOP selection algorithm does not
add complexity to commonly used technique that simply reroute by attempting
to ﬁnd a completely disjoint path using a weighted shortest path algorithm of the
network manager’s choice. With MOP, we simply change the weights.
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2.2.2 Robustness Metric
A two-link failure robustness measure called vulnerability, which measures the
number of links, upon their failure, will cause some connection(s) to fail without
recovery, was introduced in [2]. The vulnerability metric eﬀectively captures the
network robustness under two-link failures, but was originally intended to measure
networks with routing and protection at link-level granularity (ﬁber switching).
This metric is extended to path based protection by incorporating the notion of
failure of individual connections. Vulnerability can be computed by the following
formula. For two distinct links i and j, fi(j) is 1 if any connection cannot be
recovered after failure of j following failure and recovery of i.
Vulnerability ≡ 1|E|
∑
i∈E
∑
j∈E,j =i
fi(j) (2.1)
Vulnerability basically is a network-wide metric measuring what portion of the
network the overall robustness depends on. It gives us an idea of how much of
the network (in terms of averaged number of links) will aﬀect overall robustness
if an additional failure is to occur before the ﬁrst failure is physically repaired.
Therefore, a low vulnerability ﬁgure suggests that the network can mostly remain
fully operational after a second link failure, whereas high vulnerability suggests
that a second link failure is likely to bring down at least some part of the network.
We also use a metric, called failure susceptibility (FS), that quantiﬁes the net-
work’s ability to handle failures in more detail [45]. Susceptibility measures the
the number of connections that are unprotected (left without protection) from
subsequent failures, after failure and recovery of the ﬁrst failure. Initially, when
all network links are available (no failures), FS (failure susceptibilities) for all
links are zero. After the failure and recovery of some link(s), the robustness of
networks will diminish due to both algorithmic limitations as well as topological
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constraints, and FS eﬀectively captures this limitation. Average FS (AFS) then is
the average FS over all links. Note that FS/AFS depends on the traﬃc load (since
it counts the number of connections that cannot be protected), and therefore it is
only meaningful to compare diﬀerent scenarios/algorithms with the same traﬃc
load. For two-link failure scenarios, AFS of a network can be computed accord-
ing to the following formula shown below. FSk(l) = the number of connections
unrecoverable upon failure of l after recovery of the ﬁrst link failure (k).
AFS ≡ 1|E|(|E| − 1)
i∈E∑
i
j∈E∑
j,j =i
FSi(j) (2.2)
Again, the AFS metric quantiﬁes how many connections are susceptible to
future failures. It is averaged over all possible two-link failure scenarios. Note
that recovery ratio (or failure ratio, which is 1 − recovery ratio) can be easily
obtained by dividing AFS by the total number of connections aﬀected by the
failure. Both metrics depend upon the actual routed traﬃc and capture network
robustness in diﬀerent ways. Therefore, knowledge of the traﬃc load is needed.
However, the metrics are not deﬁned in terms of nor are limited to use with a
speciﬁc traﬃc matrix.
2.2.3 Failure Model and Failure Management
It is important to understand that the two metrics given in the previous section
can be readily extended to include diﬀerent failure rates for network links, given
some speciﬁc failure rates for each link. This extension can be done by simply
adding a coeﬃcient to the metrics to multiply vulnerability or susceptibility for
each link pair combination with speciﬁc failure rates.
The focus of this work, however, is not to measure and explore the space of
diﬀerent failure rates and the impact of diﬀerent failure dynamics. The goal of this
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work, as mentioned previously, is to understand and address how multiple failures
can be better managed if and when they occur. For reliable network operation, the
diﬀerent types of failures need to be managed somehow regardless of how and when
they happen. The decision to implement certain types of survivability techniques
is up to the network management, given that they have all the options and consider
the tradeoﬀs. Therefore, simple/general methods for eﬃciently handling diﬀerent
types of failures are needed. As previously mentioned it is generally understood
that sequential failures are much more likely to occur given reasonable failure
rates. Simultaneous failures on the other hand are diﬃcult to handle and mostly
requires preplanning or rerouting (unless, of course, when it is a fundamental
failure) [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Handling this type of failure can be complementary to our
work and is outside the scope of this work. Sequential failures, however, can be
handled more eﬃciently (compared to rerouting or preplanning) and addressing
this issue as eﬀectively as possible is the goal of this work.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, our work provides algorithms and mech-
anisms for protection and reconﬁguration of the network. If the network manage-
ment is able to eliminate some low risk link failure combinations, they can simply
choose to allocate less resources for the low risk failures. Again, having such
information is undoubtedly helpful, but does not change how general protection
mechanisms are designed. Instead, the two diﬀerent areas of focus with respect
to multiple failures are complementary in the overall goal of eﬃciently addressing
network robustness.
2.2.4 Filtering: Robust Path Selection
As discussed in the previous section, it is important to note that initial routing
choices can also aﬀect reconﬁguration, and in turn, the robustness of a network.
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critical links for node pair 2−9.
Links (8,9) and (9,10) are both
A new maximally robust path to 
protect the new live path (p2)
cannot be found.
Possible choices for new backup:
1) 9−8−4−2
2) 9−10−7−4−2
3) 9−10−8−4−2
path (P2).
the link that is shared with the live
They are all susceptable to failure of
is routed onto the backup path (p2).
Upon failure of link (4,10), traffic
Primary Path (p1)
Backup Path (p2)
1) 2) 3)
8 8 8
8
7
10
Figure 2.5: Non-robust path pairs. Example of non-critical link failure aﬀecting
two-link survivability due to poor initial routing choice.
In many cases, a poor initial routing choice can prevent a connection from be-
ing protected after a single link failure even if a CDP triple exists (for a three-
connected node pair) between the end nodes of a connection in the graph. For
example, in two-link failure scenarios, an assigned working and protection path
pair can prevent reconﬁguration algorithms from providing maximum protection
from additional failures. Because it is very unattractive to interrupt live traﬃc,
reconﬁguration algorithms only reallocate the backup paths (If primary paths are
reconﬁgured, live connections are disrupted even when it is not aﬀected by a fail-
ure). It is possible to have the best potential backup path blocked after the initial
failure, and we say that the working and protection path pairs are non-robust if
they prevent the network from reconﬁguring to maximum robustness. To help
understand the diﬀerence between robust and non-robust path pairs, we provide
the following example.
26
In Figure 2.5, we show a possible choice of primary and backup path pair
between nodes 2 and 9. Primary path [9-10-4-2] is one of the shortest paths
between nodes 2 and 9. Assume that backup path [9-8-7-0-2] is chosen to facilitate
capacity sharing with some other path. This primary-backup pair leaves the
network susceptible to additional failures upon failure of link (4,10). None of
the choices allow reconﬁguration to protect the connection fully (resulting in sub-
optimal robustness for this topology). The new protection path in choice 1 (shown
in dashed line with shallow arrow head) shares link (9,8) with the live path.
The same conﬂict can be seen in choices 2 and 3 on links (10-7) and (10-8)
respectively. Note that all failure combinations not including critical links should
be recoverable. The link (4-10) is not a critical link for node pair 2 and 9, yet this
particular choice of primary-backup path pair prevents optimal reconﬁguration
for the network.
We introduce a simple algorithm (shown in Figure 2.6) that ﬁlters out non-
robust path pairs, so that the working and backup path pairs can be chosen
wisely to allow maximum survivability from future failures. As discussed earlier,
this algorithm can be run just once during the network design stage (initialization)
where the results can be saved for use during online provisioning.
Figures 2.7-2.9 show the results from applying the above algorithm to diﬀerent
networks (assuming all links are available, therefore representing initial stage of
provisioning without failures). The network topologies are shown in Figure 2.11.
The charts show the total number of disjoint path pairs for each node pair, as well
as the number of non-robust pairs and the ratio of the two. They are ordered in
increasing percentage of non-robust pairs. For example the 21 bars in Figure 2.7
represent 21 node pairs in the network. The gray bars represent the total number
of disjoint path pairs for each node pair and the black bars show how many
of those path pairs are non-robust as determined by our algorithm. They are
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E - set of all links in the graph
N - set of all nodes in the graph
F - set of failed/unavailable links. Could be ∅ (no failures)
or any size set representing the current network state.
R - set of node pairs R = N ×N
Pi - set of all path for some pair i,
where i ∈ R and ∀p ∈ P, p ⊆ E
f(i, S) - function returns maximum integer ﬂow for pair i
on subgraph S, where i ∈ R, S ⊆ E
CLi - set of critical links for node pair i
CPi - all disjoint path pairs, w/ some hop limit, for i, i ∈ R
CPi = {(k1, k2), k1 ⊆ E, k2 ⊆ E, k1 ∩ k2 = ∅}
NonRobusti - all non-robust path pairs for i, NonRobusti ⊆ CPi
mi - maximum integer ﬂow for pair i
Compute critical links for all node pairs
1: for all i ∈ R do
2: mi ← f(i, E \ F )
3: for all l ∈ E do
4: nli ← f(i, E \ ({l} ∪ F ))
5: if nli < mi then
6: CLi ← CLi ∪ {l}
Find non-robust path pairs for all node pairs
1: for all i ∈ R do
2: for all (k1, k2) ∈ CPi do
3: for all l ∈ k1 ∪ k2 do
4: if l ∈ k1 then
5: temp ← f(i, E \ (k2 ∪ {l} ∪ F ))
6: else
7: temp ← f(i, E \ (k1 ∪ {l} ∪ F ))
8: if l ∈ CLi then
9: if temp < mi − 2 then
10: NonRobusti ← NonRobusti ∪ {k}
11: else
12: if temp < mi − 1 then
13: NonRobusti ← NonRobusti ∪ {k}
Figure 2.6: Algorithm for ﬁltering out poor solutions. Complexity for computing
critical links is O(|N |2|E|2dM2), dM2 is second largest node degree, using Ford-
Fulkerson algorithm for function f . Complexity for computing non-robust path
pairs is O(|N |2|CPM | |E|2 dM2), |CPM | is the maximum number of disjoint path
pairs between a node pair given some hop limit. It is important to note that both
algorithms are used for initialization and run only once for each topology.
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Figure 2.7: Ratio of non-robust and total number of primary-backup path pairs
for SUBNJ. Arbitrary length backup paths are utilized.
arranged in an increasing order of fraction of non-robust path pairs (shown by
the gray line). Note that all path pairs for some node pairs are non-robust in the
NATIONAL, LATAX and ARPANET networks when shortest primary paths are
used. Therefore, we must utilize paths that are at least one hop longer than the
shortest for the connections between those two node pairs in order to guarantee
maximum robustness. Figure 2.9 reﬂects this small change for the three networks.
Note that the ﬁgures are in decreasing order of average node degree of the
networks. It is visually clear from the graphs that, in general, as the average
node degree decreases, the likelihood of making poor routing decisions becomes
greater. Therefore, the beneﬁt of the ﬁltering algorithm varies with the average
node degree. The cost of running the algorithm is extremely small (less than a few
seconds, depending on the topology, on a desktop with Athlon 1.5Ghz processor
and 512MB of RAM), especially as the results can be saved from running the
algorithm just once for a given network topology. The complexity of the algorithm
is given in Figure 2.6. At the same time, running the ﬁltering algorithm can only
help the robustness of a network.
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NATIONAL (shortest primary path(s)) 24 nodes & 44 links
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LATA 'X' (shortest primary path(s)) 28 nodes & 47 links
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ARPANET (shortest primary path(s)) 20 nodes & 32 links
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NSFNET (shortest primary path(s)) 14 nodes & 21 links
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Figure 2.8: Ratio of non-robust and total number of primary-backup path pairs
using shortest primary paths.
2.2.5 Dynamic Protection Reconﬁguration
In this section, we describe our simple dynamic protection reconﬁguration algo-
rithm that can be used in conjunction with most existing protection schemes to
provide optimal multiple sequential failure protection. The goal is to maximize
the network’s ability to handle multiple failures (and therefore minimize service
disruptions) while taking into account capacity costs and management complexity.
As a more capacity-eﬃcient alternative to multiple failure protection plan-
ning (1+N Pre-allocation), DPR is designed to dynamically adapt to failures.
Originally, we explored the idea of quick, dynamic reconﬁguration and hinted at
the diﬀerent tradeoﬀs in using such technique in [36]. An overview of similar
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0.999
LATA 'X' (primaries w/ 1 extra hop) 28 nodes & 47 links
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ARPANET (primaries w/ 1 extra hop) 20 nodes & 32 links
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Figure 2.9: Ratio of non-robust and total number of primary-backup path pairs
using primary paths that are up to 1 hop longer than the shortest path(s).
approaches (reconﬁguration or reprovisioning) has been studied in [42]. DPR is
diﬀerent from a few related works published since the introduction of the multiple
failure evaluation in [1]. First, [35, 33, 34, 39] solves two-link survivability in the
context of link protection, but the dynamic protection reconﬁguration technique
is orthogonal to the choice of protection schemes. In this work, however, we focus
on end-to-end recovery (path protection). Furthermore, our goal is not to provide
a detailed optimization technique for a particular protection scheme per se, but
rather to study and understand the tradeoﬀs involved in attempts to maximize
network survivability under multiple sequential failures. Second, many have as-
sumed that the network is three-link connected when studying two-link failures
since three-link connected topologies allow complete recovery under any two link
failures. DPR does not limit the number of failures up to which the network
can survive. For instance, a network can fully handle n sequential failures, if the
network is at least n+ 1-connected. Employing the dynamic protection reconﬁg-
uration techniques using MOP selection and ﬁltering out non-robust path pairs
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–The goal is to quickly reconﬁgure connections that are aﬀected by a failure.
–Note that recovery paths redirect traﬃc between the source and destination nodes in path
protection.
1. After a failure, identify the three sets of connections rendered vulnerable to addi-
tional failures. These sets correspond to the three classes of algorithmic failures presented
in [2, 36].
Cph = set of connections with broken primary paths (already recovered via original protection
path)
Cbp = set of connections with broken recovery paths
Cbsp = set of connections for which the assigned protection wavelengths were used for recovery
of traﬃc in Cph.
2. Release the wavelengths used by the original primary paths in Cph and the original
backup paths in Cbp.
3. For each connection in Cph, Cbp, and Cbsp, ﬁnd new paths that minimally overlap
with the current working path. In order to maximize robustness, use the ﬁltering algorithm
with updated maximum ﬂows between each node pair. (Note: These connections are
reconﬁgured in maximum contention ﬁrst ordering similar to [42]. Connections that have a
common failure mode in their working path are said to be in contention, and therefore maxi-
mum contention ﬁrst ordering selects a connection(s) with the most number of contentions ﬁrst.)
4. Select a path for each of the aﬀected connections from the choices found in Step 3
that minimizes resource usage. [For quick reconﬁguration, we walk through the list of aﬀected
connections in random order, and greedily attempt to maximize resource sharing in assigning
wavelengths.]
Figure 2.10: Outline of a simple DPR scheme with minimally overlapping path
selection. Complexity of the steps outlined here is O(C(|E| + |N |log|N |)) (the
maximum capacity of a link in terms of the number of wavelengths in the network,
C, times the complexity of running MOP.)
as we have proposed, allows a network to reach the upper bound in survivabil-
ity (limited by the topology). Lastly, others consider a static oﬄine routing and
perform oﬄine optimization. We consider an online routing model where oﬄine
optimization is less useful.
The goal is to reconﬁgure the aﬀected connections as quickly as possible while
eﬃciently utilizing capacity. Ideally, reconﬁguration should complete as fast as
possible (order of seconds). This duration consists of the computation time and
the network setup time. Figure 2.10 shows an outline of the steps involved in
dynamic protection reconﬁguration. New protection paths are found by using the
same path selection technique used for originally provisioning lightpaths in the
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network and starts immediately after a failure is detected. We assume that a
centralized manager keeps track of information on all connections and that the
aﬀected connections are easily identiﬁed once the failure is recovered and located.
Keeping a small data structure that tracks all the primary paths and the recovery
paths provisioned on each link is useful in quickly identifying connections that
are aﬀected by the failure. Once the failure is detected, a simple lookup can be
performed using the data structure.
2.2.6 Optimal Protection Reconﬁguration
Optimal protection reconﬁguration (OPR) provides the optimal solution (in terms
of the number of extra λ-channels used) for paths re-selection and wavelength
assignment for reconﬁguring all connections that are aﬀected by a failure. An OPR
solution for a particular failure is obtained by solving an NP-hard mixed integer
linear programming problem (ILP). A large amount of memory and computational
power is required to obtain OPR solutions in practice (depending on the size
of the network and the traﬃc load) and may be unattractive in many cases as
reconﬁguration must be completed as quickly as possible. However, OPR solutions
provide lower bounds for the cost of reconﬁguration algorithms and also may be
used in reoptimization once the network is protected from additional failures (via
a faster reconﬁguration algorithm).
In this section, we illustrate an ILP formulation for OPR based on the failure
information. OPR aims at selecting new protection paths for connections that
are left vulnerable to additional failures. First we deﬁne some notation, shown
in Table 2.2. Let E be the set of edges and W be the ordered set of available λ-
channels on each edge. Note that the λ-channels which are currently occupied by
up-to-date primaries (working paths), including the backups for primaries aﬀected
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by the failure, are not included in W since they are not available and carry active
traﬃc. The λ-channels occupied by backup paths of connections unaﬀected by
the failure are included. R is the set of all connections. A ⊆ R is the set of
all connections that are aﬀected by the failure (Cph ∪ Cbp ∪ Cbsp from Fig. 10).
U ⊆ R is the set of all connections not aﬀected by the failure. Note R = U ∪ A.
Conﬂicting connection pairs are denoted as a pair of connections who share a
common link in their primary paths (and are aﬀected simultaneously when the
common link fails). These pairs cannot share a λ-channel for their backup paths.
Let C ⊆ R×R be the set of connection pair tuples that conﬂict with each other.
Let br be the unaﬀected backup path for each unaﬀected connection r ∈ U . Let
B =
⋃
r∈U br be set of all unaﬀected backup paths. Note that the λ-channels used
by br’s are available for use by other backup paths as long as there is no conﬂict
in the primaries as described above. Let fr be either primary or backup path for
r ∈ A that are no longer used (a link is broken by the failure or some part of
the backup path is now being used by another connection). This set obviously
excludes the broken link and the λ-channels now being used to carry live path as
part of backup paths for failed connections. Let F =
⋃
r∈A fr be the set of all
freed paths. There is no additional cost for using the λ-channels in fr’s. Maximal
sharing of λ-channels with paths in B and F is desired in order to reduce the
overall capacity cost. CBr is an ordered set of candidate backup paths (either
CDP or MOP) for aﬀected pairs r ∈ A.
To simplify the formulation, we introduce some functions. tr(e, w, P ) returns
a subset of paths S ⊆ P for some path set P . Each path p ∈ S traverses edge
e ∈ E and wavelength w ∈W . l(p) returns the set of edges in the path p. λ(p, e)
returns the wavelength assignment on edge e. ch(p) is a tuple (l(p), λ(p, e)) of the
particular edge and wavelength that are assigned to path p.
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Table 2.2: Deﬁnitions for Optimal Reconﬁguration.
E set of edges.
W ordered set of λ-channels not carrying live traﬃc.
R set of all connections.
A set of connections aﬀected by the failure.
U set of unaﬀected connections.
C set of conﬂicting connection pair tuples.
br backup path for the unaﬀected connection r ∈ U .
B set of br’s.
fr freed path of the aﬀected connection r ∈ A.
F set of fr’s.
CBr ordered set of candidate backup path (CDP or MOP) for aﬀected
connections r ∈ A.
tr(e, w, P ) function returns a subset of path of P traversing edge e
and wavelength w.
l(p) function returns the set of edges traversing by path p.
λ(p, e) function returns the wavelength assigned to path p on edge e.
ch(p) function returns the tuple (l(p), λ(p, e)).
Xewrp binary variable taking 1 when the wth wavelength on edge e
is assigned to the pth candidate path of aﬀected connection r.
0 otherwise.
Y ew binary variable is 1 when the wth wavelength on e is assigned
to some path. 0 otherwise.
Zrp binary variable is 1 when pth candidate path for aﬀected pair r
is selected. 0 otherwise.
Finally we deﬁne some ILP variables. Xewrp is a binary variable set to one when
the wth wavelength on edge e is traversed by the pth candidate path of a aﬀected
pair r, where p ∈ CBr, r ∈ A. Xewrp zero when the resource is not occupied by
path p. Y ew is a binary variable indicating the occupancy of λ-channels. Y ew is
one when the wth wavelength on edge e is taken by some path and zero for free.
Zrp is a binary variable indicating the path selection. Zrp is one when the pth
candidate path for aﬀected pair r is chosen and zero when not chosen. Table 2.2
summarizes these notations.
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The ILP formulation is as follows. The objective function minimizes the total
number of extra λ-channels that must be allocated for reconﬁguration.
Minimize
∑
e∈E,w∈W,(e,w)/∈ch(p)
Y ew, where p ∈ B ∪ F (2.3)
The following two constraints enforce that two primaries that have the same
link(s) along the path are assigned to separate λ-channels for their backups to
prevent sharing (because they can fail at the same time and need separate re-
sources to recover at the same time). These connections are said to be conﬂicting.
There are two cases for conﬂicting connections. The ﬁrst case is that one pair
is unaﬀected and the other is aﬀected. Then the aﬀected pair cannot share the
λ-channels with the known backup paths of the unaﬀected. For all (r1, r2) ∈ C,
if r1 ∈ U, r2 ∈ A, then for all e ∈ E,w ∈W, (e, w) = ch(br1),
∑
p∈tr(e,w,CBr2)
Xewrp = 0 (2.4)
The second case is that both connections are aﬀected. Thus on the λ-channels
traversed by some candidate paths of both pairs should only be assigned to at
most one of them. If r1 ∈ A, r2 ∈ A, then for all e ∈ E,w ∈W ,
∑
p∈tr(e,w,CBr1)
Xewr1p +
∑
p∈tr(e,w,CBr2)
Xewr2p ≤ 1 (2.5)
Each λ-channel is counted once when multiple paths share the λ-channel.
For all e ∈ E,w ∈W ,
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Y ew ≤
∑
r∈A
∑
p∈tr(e,w,CBr)
Xewrp (2.6)
Y ew
∑
r∈A
|CBr| ≥
∑
r∈A
∑
p∈tr(e,w,CBr)
Xewrp (2.7)
Each path is only assigned to one wavelength on each link it traverses.
For all r ∈ A, p ∈ CBr, e ∈ l(p),
Zrp =
∑
w∈W
Xewrp (2.8)
Only one path amongst all computed paths for each aﬀected connections are
selected as the new backup path. For all r ∈ A,
∑
p∈CBr
Zrp = 1 (2.9)
The above ILP formulation can be easily converted into a pre-computed recon-
ﬁguration version, where all link failures are considered by expanding the variables
to one more dimension and the sum of all extra λ-channels used for all links is
minimized. Speciﬁcally, Xewrp becomes X
ewl
rp , where l ∈ E, represents the recon-
ﬁguration variable under the failure of link l. Similarly, we have Y ewl and Z lrp.
For each link failure, above constraints are formulated according to the failure
information, such as aﬀected connections, unaﬀected pairs and candidate paths.
The objective function is then changed to sum up all Y ewl, i.e.,
Minimize
∑
l∈E
∑
e∈E,w∈W,(e,w)/∈ch(p)
Y ewl, where p ∈ Bl ∪ F l (2.10)
Note that the associated failure information Bl and F l varies with the failed
link l. Based on the pre-selected original primary and backup path pairs for each
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connection, the expanded ILP formulation will yield the optimal secondary backup
solution for all failure cases and maximize the sharing of λ-channels amongst non-
conﬂicting pairs. However, the new problem set becomes |E|2 times larger than
the original one. Therefore, an ILP solution for pre-computed reconﬁguration
may not be attractive in practice.
2.3 Evaluation
This section provides the results from our work. We study DPR based on both
MOP as well as CDP using seven representative networks shown in Figure 2.11 and
the simple network we used to illustrate fundamental limits shown in Figure 2.1
(FunLim). We next provide the evaluation details before discussing the results.
2.3.1 Network and Traﬃc Model
To some extent, failure impact depends on the network traﬃc conditions. There-
fore, the study of diﬀerent protection algorithms requires a fair and consistent
basis for comparison. We assume uniform traﬃc demands, which can eﬀectively
aid in capturing the tradeoﬀs of the algorithms presented in this work. We also
consider an on-line provisioning model with uniformly distributed full-mesh traﬃc
demands (consistent with other related works found in the literature [19]), and
we assume that the network is optically opaque and capable of full wavelength
conversion at each hop. On-line provisioning means that we have no knowledge
of future demands, and cannot reroute existing connections on the network to
optimize provisioning upon receipt of a new request. Each request is assumed to
be a bidirectional connection with a uniformly distributed demand of one connec-
tion between each source and destination. (N×(N-1))/2 bidirectional requests are
routed in random order to simulate an on-line provisioning process. Although, in
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Arpanet
NJ LATA
National
LATA ‘X’
NSFNET
COST 239
SubNJ
Figure 2.11: Sample Networks.
practice, the demands may not be uniformly distributed among diﬀerent requests,
we believe that studying uniformly distributed traﬃc demands is eﬀective in that
it suﬃciently shows the tradeoﬀs in using our proposed technique for the purpose
of studying multiple failure survivability. We assume that each λ-channel has a
cost of 1 in terms of calculating capacity. The total cost of capacity is therefore
the sum of the overall of working paths and the total number of the reserved pro-
tection wavelengths. Although a uniformly distributed traﬃc demand is assumed
for evaluation in this work, the failure classiﬁcation scheme, and the algorithms
we presented assume nothing about the traﬃc model.
We use shared path (end-to-end) protection and greedily select a link-disjoint
path pair, between the source and destination nodes, based on capacity cost for
allocating each path pair. In other words, paths are chosen to minimize its al-
location cost assuming no knowledge of future connection requests. Wavelength
assignment for a backup route is determined by evaluating all possible available
wavelengths to maximize sharing (minimize cost). With the on-line routing model,
it is also assumed that no previously routed lightpaths can be disrupted to per-
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form rerouting optimizations. The path selection process is similar to the joint
selection algorithm presented in [15], where all choices of primary and backup
paths within the path length requirements are considered. Note that a pool-
based reservation [17] for backup wavelengths can also be used along with our
approach without loss of eﬃcacy in terms of robustness. However, we assigned
speciﬁc wavelengths because, upon diﬀerent link failures, computing sharing in-
formation for reconﬁguration is simpler and faster if each backup path is assigned
to speciﬁc wavelengths (because compatibility between diﬀerent backup paths
change when some backup paths become active and some become obsolete due
to a failed link and assigning speciﬁc wavelengths can signiﬁcantly reduce the
number of connections that need to be considered for compatibility checks).
As discussed in Section 2.2.5, because we hope to restore lightpaths after two
links are cut, we must choose the primary/backup path pair that allows another
link-disjoint path. Again, this constraint virtually has no eﬀect on routing. Con-
nections with either degree two source or destination nodes, or both, do not have
three CDPs. For DPR-CDP, they results in capacity failures. For DPR-MOP, we
use the MOP selection technique presented in the previous section.
2.3.2 Results
Tables 2.3 shows the results for the LATAX network. They are arranged in a way
that makes it easier to visualize the eﬀect of the ﬁltering algorithm as well as the
MOP selection. First, AFS and vulnerability are shown with and without the
ﬁltering when the network is not reconﬁgured after the ﬁrst failure. When the
network is not reconﬁgured, over 20 connections are lost when a second failure
occurs, and the network is vulnerable to 45.9 links on average. Note that the
maximum two-link failure vulnerability for a given network is |E| − 1.
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Second, ﬁltering beneﬁts both CDP and MOP cases in terms of both AFS
and vulnerability. As mentioned in the previous section, this beneﬁt can vary
depending on the network topology as well as the traﬃc load. Using the ﬁltering
algorithm always yields a solution that is at least as good as provisioning without
ﬁltering when reconﬁguration is used.
No AFS 20.39
Reconﬁg. Vulnerability 45.9
Not Filtered Filtered
CDP AFS 1.02 0.81
Vulnerability 13.15 9.0
MOP AFS 0.19 0.15
Vulnerability 1.0 0.40
Table 2.3: Evaluation results for LATAX network. Maximum two-link failure vul-
nerability for LATAX is |E|−1 = 46. Topological limit for AFS and Vulnerability
are 0.15 and 0.40 respectively
Finally, utilizing MOPs can signiﬁcantly improve network robustness as clearly
shown in this table. With MOP selection, network vulnerability is signiﬁcantly
improved. Vulnerability of 9 to 13.15 links with CDP (depending on whether or
not ﬁltering is used) improves to 1 or less when MOP is used. It shows that for
LATAX, on average, out of the 46 possible second failures, the network is only
vulnerable to 1 of them. Note that we can get the fraction of average connections
that are left susceptible to a failure to the total number of connections that are
aﬀected by the failure by looking at the ratio between AFS and the average number
of aﬀected connections shown in Table 2.4 (note that recovery ratio is simply one
minus this number).
Similarly, Table 2.4 shows all of the results from our simulations. The networks
are arranged in a decreasing order of average node degree. The total number of
connections represent the number of routed bidirectional connections. Average
number of aﬀected connections represent the number of connections that are af-
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Network NJLATA COST 239 NATIONAL LATAX
|N |, |E| 11, 23 19, 37 24, 44 28, 47
Avg. Node Degree 4.18 3.89 3.67 3.36
Total number
of Connections
55 171 276 378
Avg. # of
aﬀected connections
4.64 11.22 19.88 28.67
AFS Before Reconﬁg. 3.17 8.43 15.46 20.39
Vul. Before Reconﬁg. 19.74 35.78 42.91 45.91
Not CDP AFS 0.34 0.68 1.40 1.02
Filtered Vul. 3.30 7.97 8.55 13.15
MOP AFS 0.12 0.21 0.51 0.19
Vul. 0.26 0.41 0.77 1.0
Filtered CDP AFS 0.34 0.68 1.33 0.81
Vul. 3.30 7.92 7.70 9.00
MOP AFS 0.12 0.21 0.50 0.15
Vul. 0.26 0.38 0.59 0.40
AFS fundamental limit 0.12 0.21 0.50 0.15
Vul. fundamental limit 0.26 0.38 0.59 0.40
Network ARPA SubNJ NSFNET FunLim
|N |, |E| 20, 32 7, 11 14, 21 6, 8
Avg. Node Degree 3.2 3.14 3.00 2.67
Total number
of Connections
190 21 91 15
Avg. # of
aﬀected connections
18.01 3.55 10.64 3.57
AFS Before Reconﬁg. 13.89 2.95 9.24 3.16
Vul. Before Reconﬁg. 31.0 10.0 20.00 7.0
Not CDP AFS 0.19 0.80 0.57 1.05
Filtered Vul. 4.0 3.73 5.86 4.13
MOP AFS 0.03 0.33 0.14 0.45
Vul. 0.53 0.55 0.52 1.13
Filtered CDP AFS 0 0.80 0.40 0.89
Vul. 0 3.73 2.71 3.25
MOP AFS 0 0.33 0.12 0.39
Vul. 0 0.55 0.19 0.75
AFS fundamental limit 0 0.33 0.12 0.36
Vul. fundamental limit 0 0.55 0.19 0.50
Table 2.4: Evaluation results for eight sample networks (Measurements after fail-
ure and recovery of a single link and before the second link failure). ARPANET’s
Vul. and AFS can be reduced to 0 using the ﬁltering algorithm because it is a
3-connected network.
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fected by the initial failure (either primary is broken or the backup is no longer
available), and therefore left susceptible to future failures. AFS and vulnerability
measures before reconﬁguration are shown only for the un-ﬁltered scenario (AFS
only varies by 2-5% and vulnerability by less than 1% and neither case is better
than the other). The small initial diﬀerence seen here is due to the diﬀerence in
the originally chosen routes, and have no real impact on the overall robustness of
the network as we are considering reconﬁguration techniques. The general pat-
tern shown in the results with LATAX network holds true for all of the networks.
As mentioned in the previous section, in general, networks with lower average
node degree tend to beneﬁt more from the ﬁltering algorithm as the likelihood of
initially selecting and provisioning poor path pairs increases with the decreasing
average node degree. There is also a signiﬁcant improvement in network robust-
ness when using MOP selection over CDP selection. AFS improves by a factor of
3 or more depending on the network, and vulnerability improves by a factor of 7
to 20. The fundamental limits represent the maximum robustness (minimum AFS
and minimum vulnerability) possible under the given topology, where it is limited
only by physical disconnections. For all networks, except our example graph, Fun-
Lim, utilizing the ﬁltering algorithm along with protection reconﬁguration under
MOP selection allows the networks to achieve the maximum robustness.
Table 2.5 shows the reconﬁguration costs. Initial capacity cost is simply the
sum of all λ-channels used in provisioning a uniform full mesh demand with shared
path protection. The diﬀerence in capacity cost between using and not using the
robust path ﬁltering algorithm is trivial. Neither case was better than the other
in terms of this cost (diﬀerence was less than 2%), but, as discussed previously,
ﬁltering can signiﬁcantly improve robustness. The small diﬀerence in cost is ex-
pected as diﬀerent paths are selected in provisioning yielding diﬀerent capacity
sharing through online routing. There is about 20% diﬀerence between CDP and
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Network NJ COST NATIONAL LATAX
Initial Capacity Cost 314 1190 2552 4034
Not CDP Avg. Rcnf. Cost 29.3 82.6 178.1 377.1
Filtered MOP Avg. Rcnf. Cost 34.3 96.8 221.5 456.4
Filtered CDP Avg. Rcnf. Cost 29.6 76.2 167.6 381.7
MOP Avg. Rcnf. Cost 34.0 90.0 208.4 456.8
Filtered, MOP, Optimal Rcnfg. Cost 11.4 * * *
Network ARPA SubNJ NSFNET FunLim
Initial Capacity Cost 1644 110 588 80
Not CDP Avg. Rcnf. Cost 246.9 14.9 104.6 15.5
Filtered MOP Avg. Rcnf. Cost 270.8 19.1 114.9 21.8
Filtered CDP Avg. Rcnf. Cost 250.9 14.9 99.6 17.5
MOP Avg. Rcnf. Cost 266.0 19.1 107.9 23.8
Filtered, MOP, Optimal Rcnfg. Cost * 7.2 42.8 12.0
Table 2.5: Reconﬁguration cost results for eight sample networks. * symbol de-
notes ILP problems too large to run on our computers.
MOP selection in terms of reconﬁguration cost because MOP selection assigns
many more λ-channels for protection where CDP does not (because no protection
paths can be found using CDP selection). The diﬀerence in capacity cost be-
tween ﬁltered and not ﬁltered is small, and are mostly due to online provisioning,
which selects paths and computes reserve capacity sharing in a greedy manner (as
connections arrive).
Optimal costs for reconﬁguration with MOP were computed using CPLEX
software with our ILP formulations for NJLATA, SubNJ, NSFNET and FunLim
networks, and are shown at the bottom row of the table. The results from other
networks are not available because the ILP problems are too large to run in a
reasonable space and time run on the machines available to us. Finding the
optimal reconﬁguration cost, however, is not the focus of this work. The goal
was to study the robustness of the networks. Obviously, using the simple greedy
heuristic we used to assign reconﬁguration capacity is one of the quickest ways to
reconﬁgure the network, and running a full optimization would probably be the
slowest method for reconﬁguration. It is also important to note that, in practice,
with a large traﬃc load or as the traﬃc load increases, full optimization process
becomes less and less attractive as the network is left vulnerable during the time
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it takes to compute the optimal answer and follow up with reconﬁguration. One
simple approach is to quickly reconﬁgure the network using a greedy solution, and
rearranging it once a better solution has been computed. It may also be possible
to ﬁnd a better heuristic in the problem space of cost versus computation time,
but is outside the scope of this work and is left for future work.
2.4 Summary
In order to further guarantee reliable network services for increasing communica-
tions demands, we must understand the impact of diﬀerent failure scenarios and
provide eﬀective ways to address the challenges that arise under diﬀerent failure
models. Graceful degradation is a key issue that must be considered in designing
more robust and dependable future networks. To this end, multiple sequential
failure survivability is an important measures of a network’s ability to operate
eﬀectively under failures.
Pre-planning multiple recovery routes and reserving enough wavelengths to
allow a network to recover from multiple failures can be expensive in terms of
protection capacity. In contrast, dynamic protection reconﬁguration can allow a
network to achieve high survivability under multiple failures while utilizing little
additional capacity.
Our experiments showed that a large number of choices of working and protec-
tion path pairs limit the network from achieving optimal robustness from multiple
failures. The algorithm we presented eﬃciently ﬁlters out these poor choices. Us-
ing our MOP selection algorithm, after using the ﬁltering algorithm, allows the
network to achieve optimal survivability under sequential failures.
On several representative networks, dynamic protection reconﬁguration (with
robust path ﬁltering and MOP selection) required little additional capacity for
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shared path protection while allowing networks to operate with the maximum
multiple failure survivability for a given network topology, where only disconnec-
tions (topological separation) can leave lightpaths unrecoverable.
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CHAPTER 3
Reliability-Diﬀerentiated Management
As demand increases for more robust and ﬂuid communications to support our
growing reliance on rapid access to information, the need for eﬃcient and reliable
networks becomes critical. The use of WDM technology in the backbone networks
has enabled us to meet these demands by taking advantage of the huge capacity
of optical ﬁbers. Numerous protection schemes exist for these networks, but in
practice most networks use only one or two such schemes, roughly classifying
customers into those that need robust connectivity and those that do not. In this
work, we examine the potential beneﬁts of using a broader system of protection
classiﬁcations to support data traﬃc and present a novel approach to optimization
across classes that reduces the protection capacity necessary to support a given
traﬃc load.
Most WDM backbones still carry primarily SONET (Synchronous Optical
NETwork) streams, which in turn consist mostly of virtual ATM (Asynchronous
Transfer Mode) circuits. IP (Internet Protocol) packets are then layered atop
ATM, with virtual circuits providing the links between routers. However, as
projected in [49], data communication volume has grown exponentially, while
voice has grown only linearly. Currently, voice transmissions accounts for only a
tiny fraction of total traﬃc, making the use of protocols designed to carry such
traﬃc questionable.
SONET and ATMwere both designed more than a decade ago by the telephony
industry at a time when data traﬃc was essentially irrelevant in the wide area.
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While they are both mature, well-established and well-tested protocols, they do
not necessarily do a good job in addressing the needs of data traﬃc. One issue in
particular is the inclusion of recovery functionality at all four layers mentioned,
leading to ineﬃcient use of physical resources as well as complex synchronization
schemes to avoid interference between layers when a problem occurs.
Many researchers have thus begun to investigate the possibility of coupling the
IP layer more closely to the WDM layer, removing most of the replicated func-
tionality in SONET and ATM and moving the rest into IP, WDM, or a slim layer
between the two [50]. If the layers are reorganized, the proper layer for protection
functionality is unclear. These issues are currently addressed in markedly diﬀer-
ent ways in the two layers. Restoration time has long been considered an aspect
of quality-of-service (QoS) in many circuit-switched networks like ATM [51, 52].
WDM protection schemes oﬀer fast restoration, often on the order of the 60-
millisecond restoration requirement imposed for SONET self-healing rings. In
sharp contrast, recovery through Internet routing protocols, whether within an
Autonomous System (AS) using Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) or between
them using BGP-4 [53], can currently take minutes [54, 55]. Some claim that
these long times are not fundamental to the protocols themselves, but in practice,
security concerns with automatic routing updates have dramatically slowed the
propagation of failure information with BGP-4, in which information is usually
only forwarded to neighbors every 30 seconds [53].
We believe that protection functionality must be supported in both layers.
WDM schemes that support restoration over several autonomous, independently-
managed domains have yet to be developed, and are unlikely to be simple. Such
recovery must occur within the IP framework. When possible, however, recovery
should be fast to support applications that need high availability, such as air
traﬃc control, remote surgery, and certain types of transactions. Protection at
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the physical layer must thus also be made available, and customers allowed to
diﬀerentiate themselves according to their needs. As with most optimization
problems, relaxing constraints by allowing additional protection options reduces
the protection capacity requirements for a WDM network. Schemes in which IP
controls nearly all WDM-layer functionality [56] may be feasible, but a diverse set
of protection schemes is attractive.
A WDM network that supports several compatible protection schemes also
oﬀers opportunities to optimize across connections using diﬀerent schemes. In
addition to exploring the beneﬁts of increased protection service diﬀerentiation,
this work describes an optimization for networks that oﬀer both dedicated (one-
for-one, or 1:1) and shared (one-for-N, or 1:N) protection that allows capacity costs
to be reduced by as much as 15% when only these two schemes are supported,
and by 5-10% in a network with more protection schemes.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we
describe related background material in more detail. Section 3.2 outlines our
approach to protection-diﬀerentiated QoS and introduces our protection classi-
ﬁcations. Section 3.3 describes our methodology for evaluating the beneﬁts of
diﬀerentiation and introduces an interesting optimization for 1:1/1:N protection.
Section 3.4 gives our results and a discussion of their meaning. Finally, a summary
is provided in Section 3.5.
3.1 Protection-based Service Diﬀerentiation
3.1.1 QoS Under WDM Networks
The idea of supporting protection diﬀerentiation in optics is not new, but neither
has it been thoroughly explored. Early work in this area [57, 58] primarily ad-
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dressed issues of physical signal quality and blocking probability. More recently,
a study proposed leveraging the emerging Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS)
standards, which support the identiﬁcation of the customer or group of customers
behind a particular packet in a traﬃc ﬂow through the use of labels within head-
ers [59]. In coordination with the optics, the MPLS ﬂow classiﬁcation can then
include a resilience class. This study [59] fairly clearly demonstrates the bene-
ﬁts of supporting multiple resilience classes for reducing protection capacity, but
assumes that all unprotected traﬃc can be preempted in the event of a failure
and performs oﬀ-line routing and optimization. We split unprotected traﬃc into
preemptable and non-preemptable classes, as we believe that the increased vulner-
ability due to preemption will be unattractive to many customers. In IP/MPLS
over WDM networks, many paths in the optical layer will be provisioned without
any protection, therefore, preempting these traﬃc my have undesirable eﬀects on
the upper layer protocols (IP/MPLS, TCP etc.). In addition, oﬀ-line optimiza-
tion is used in [59]. As both the size and the complexity of networks increases,
especially in IP/MPLS over WDM networks, dynamic routing becomes more at-
tractive than static routing as lightpaths will be required to be setup and torn
down dynamically to meet the communication demands. We therefore perform
online routing which does not allow oﬀ-line optimization that can aid in reducing
cost in terms of capacity usage. We also present results on the average number of
connections broken by a failure and the percentage of traﬃc that were protected
for free (with zero capacity cost), thus providing more insight into these tradeoﬀs.
3.1.2 Survivability
Failures in optical networks result in loss of enormous data and revenue. Some of
these failures include channel failures, link failures and failures of optical cross-
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Class
Priority
(Class A)
Protected
(Class B)
Reroutable
(Class C)
Unprotected
(Class D)
Pre-emptable
(Class E)
Protection Scheme 1:1 or 1+1 1:N Best-eﬀort rerouting None [Pre-emption]
Recovery Time 20∼50ms 90ms seconds Duration of
the failure
Duration of
the failure
Data Loss 20ms 90ms seconds
Duration of
the failure
Duration of
the failure
Table 3.1: Protection based QoS classes.
connects (OXC). Channel failures caused by card failures at a port of an optical
switch are the most common type of failures in optical networks. Links failures
(ﬁber cuts caused by wayward backhoes, ampliﬁer failures etc.) are also common,
and can result in failures of all the channels that are carried on the ﬁber. Node
(OXC) failures are less common, but can cause failures of all the links that are
adjacent to the node.
Protection and Restoration are the two main approaches that address fail-
ures in optical networks [60, 61]. Restoration addresses failures by locating free
λ-channels for backup after a failure occurs. Protection preplans backup routes
that are used in the event of a failure. Protection and restoration oﬀer a tradeoﬀ
between the speed of recovery and eﬃciency in terms of the use of spare capacity
[11, 12]. However, protection can be implemented in a capacity eﬃcient manner
[15, 16, 17, 18, 19] and can oﬀer much faster recovery than restoration with the
absence of the signaling delay needed for dynamic route discovery [20, 21, 22].
Restoration schemes ﬁnd a recovery route dynamically, which takes about 2 sec-
onds, whereas protection schemes can achieve complete recovery in the order of
tens of milliseconds [23]. We therefore focus on protection, and for the rest of this
chapter, we use the terms restoration and protection interchangeably to mean
protection as deﬁned above.
There are two types of protection: local (link or node) protection and path
protection. Path protection requires the knowledge of the whole path and selec-
tion of a backup path that is shared risk group (SRG) disjoint from the primary.
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Scheme Traﬃc Demand Ratio (Protection Class)
S1: 5 classes - Optimized 1(A):2(B):4(C):2(D):1(E)
S2: 5 classes 1(A):2(B):4(C):2(D):1(E)
S3: 2 classes 0(A):3(B):0(C):7(D):0(E)
S4: 2 classes 3(A):0(B):0(C):7(D):0(E)
S5: 1 class 0(A):0(B):0(C):10(D):0(E)
S6: 1 class 0(A):10(B):0(C):0(D):0(E)
S7: 1 class 10(A):0(B):0(C):0(D):0(E)
Table 3.2: Protection based QoS classes.
In 1+1 protection, traﬃc is sent out over both paths and the receiving node sim-
ply switches to the backup stream in the event of a failure [23]. 1+1 protection
oﬀers very fast recovery with little data loss because no signaling is required be-
tween the source and the destination nodes, but is ineﬃcient in terms of capacity
requirements. 1:1 protection is same as 1+1 except the data stream is not actively
sent out, but switched after a failure. In shared path protection schemes, the end
nodes of a lightpath signal the intermediate nodes to establish the backup route.
Capacity reserved for backup can be shared among diﬀerent connections that do
not share same SRGs, or can also be used to carry low priority (unprotected)
traﬃc, which is preempted in the event of a failure. The signaling and conﬁgu-
ration of the intermediate PXCs render shared mesh protection slow compared
to 1+1/1:1 protection. In link protection, nodes that are adjacent to the failure
initiate recovery by reserving spare capacity and signaling and conﬁguring the
intermediate nodes after a failure in a manner akin to path protection. However,
recovery of failures usually involves the use of more local resources compared to
path protection. Recovery is usually faster because it is initiated by the end nodes
of the failed link (vs. path protection), but link protection is less eﬃcient in terms
of spare capacity usage [16, 18].
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3.2 Protection Diﬀerentiated QoS
Diﬀerent network clients and applications have diﬀerent survivability needs rang-
ing from mission critical applications requiring immediate recovery with mini-
mized data loss to lower-end user traﬃc with no survivability needs. Diﬀerent
protection algorithms oﬀer diﬀerent protection capabilities such as speed of re-
covery, data loss, provisioning costs and management overhead. Utilizing link
protection and dynamic restoration for diﬀerent classes of traﬃc can provide suf-
ﬁcient diﬀerentiation among traﬃc classes with diﬀerent survivability needs, but
at the cost of having two diﬀerent protocols to operate and manage. In order
to reduce management overhead, we choose to utilize a single class of protection
algorithms. For this reason, we focus on path protection to meet our goal to lower
operation costs through protection diﬀerentiated QoS. In this section we propose
a ﬁve classiﬁcation schemes and discuss the details of each protection class.
3.2.1 Protection Classes
Table 3.1 shows the proposed classiﬁcation scheme for protection based QoS sup-
port in optical notworks. We next brieﬂy explain each class diﬀerentiated by
protection requirements.
Priority Class (Class A)
Mission critical traﬃc that require high availability, low loss service can utilize
lightpaths of this class. Dedicated path protection (1:1 or 1+1) is used for this
class of service and achieves the highest level of protection. Recovery of a link
failure takes about 20ms for 1+1 or 40ms for 1:1. Up to about 20ms (failure
detection and switching time at the end nodes, and possibly propagation delay)
of data is lost after the failure. Protection resources are pre-allocated and the
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recovery paths are preconﬁgured (paths are computed and the switches along the
paths are pre-set). Less data is lost when 1+1 is used, but 1+1 is more expensive
operate compared to 1:1 because traﬃc needs to be actively duplicated and sent
out over two live paths in the network. When 1:1 protection is used, protection
paths can be used to carry the pre-emptable class traﬃc to reduce capacity cost.
Protected Class (Class B)
Service classes with a lower level of protection requirement can be assigned to
Class B. Shared path protection (1:N) is used for this class. Recovery paths
are computed, but the switches along the paths are not preconﬁgured. This
ﬂexibility allows sharing of protection resource among diﬀerent lightpaths and
reduces capacity cost. Recovery takes about 90ms to complete with 50 to 90ms
of data loss.
Reroutable Class (Class C)
Reroutable traﬃc are given shortest path working paths and have no protection
resource allocated for use. However, best eﬀort rerouting may be done after
a failure to recover some of the Class C traﬃc. Rerouting is done using the
unused protection resources allocated for Class A and B after the Class A and B
traﬃc are fully recovered. The average number of Class C traﬃc that cannot be
rerouted after a failure is given in Section . Network service providers may reserve
additional capacity to increase the recovery ratio. Shortest paths are assigned for
this type of traﬃc to reduce total capacity cost. Rerouting can begin immediately
after a failure and can take up to several seconds.
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Unprotected Class (Class D)
Class D traﬃc are also assigned shortest available paths in the network to reduce
capacity cost. They have no protection from failures and cannot be rerouted.
Data is lost until a physical repair is made.
Pre-emptable Class (Class E)
Pre-emptable class traﬃc are the cheapest to provision. Routing can take advan-
tage of resources that are already provisioned for protection of either Class A or
B traﬃc to reduce capacity cost. Furthermore, Unprotected traﬃc can be pre-
empted to make room for rerouting class C traﬃc in case of a failure. Generally,
data is lost until a physical repair is made, but more data can be lost if lightpaths
were pre-empted to make room for Class A or B’s recovery. Lightpaths that were
pre-empted are brought back only after having the Class A or B traﬃc restored
to their original working paths.
3.2.2 Classiﬁcation Scheme
Table 3.2 shows 7 diﬀerent protection based diﬀerentiation schemes that we eval-
uate. S1 and S2 represent 5 class diﬀerentiation scheme we propose for QoS
routing at the optical layer. S1 improves capacity performance over S2 by using
a novel sharing optimization explained in the next section. S3 and S4 consist of
two classes of traﬃc diﬀerentiated by whether or not protection is provided. They
only diﬀer in the choice of protection algorithm used for the protected class traﬃc.
S5–S7 are based on single class traﬃc. In S5, all lightpaths are unprotected. In
S6 and S7, all lightpaths are protected. Like S3 and S4, S6 and S7 diﬀer only by
the choice of protection algorithm used.
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3.3 Capacity Assignment
An important motivation for having protection based QoS is to reduce network
operation costs. An eﬃcient capacity assignment scheme for protection based QoS
is needed as the classiﬁcation and the choice of protection services directly aﬀect
cost in terms of provisioned network capacity.
3.3.1 Routing and Wavelength Assignment
We assume uniform traﬃc demands which can eﬀectively aid in capturing the dif-
ferent characteristics of the classiﬁcation schemes. In the simulations, we perform
dynamic on-line provisioning with uniformly distributed full-mesh traﬃc demands
scaled by a factor of 10. Dynamic provisioning means that we have no knowledge
of future demands, and cannot reroute existing connections on the network to op-
timize provisioning upon receipt of a new request. Each request is assumed to be
a bidirectional connection with a uniformly distributed demand of 1 lightpath be-
tween each source and destination. Table 3.2 shows the traﬃc ratios between each
class of traﬃc for the diﬀerent classiﬁcation schemes where 1 equals a uniformly
distributed demand of full-mesh, (N×(N-1))/2, bidirectional requests. Traﬃc de-
mands are routed in random order to simulate an on-line provisioning process.
Although, in practice, the demands may not be uniformly distributed among dif-
ferent requests, we believe that studying uniformly distributed traﬃc demands is
suﬃcient in that it shows the characteristics of diﬀerent protection schemes for
comparison purposes. We assume that each λ-channel has a cost of 1 in terms of
calculating capacity. The total cost of capacity is therefore the sum of the overall
of working paths and the total number of the reserved protection λ-channels.
For both Class A and Class B with 1+1/1:1 and 1:N protection, we utilize
a joint path selection method similar to the one used in [15]. The working and
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protection paths are selected together to minimize the capacity cost. We always
route classes C and D using shortest paths. If Class E exists in the classiﬁca-
tion scheme, then routing depends on whether or not protection resources are
reserved in the network. Class E lightpath are routed over an existing dedicated
protection paths with the same source and destination. If protection resources
are allocated to protect Class B, we ﬁnd paths such that the cost is minimized
via sharing with Class B’s protection resources. If no sharing is possible, the
algorithm automatically will choose shortest paths.
3.3.2 Sharing Optimization
The key to our optimization algorithm is the sharing of protection resources be-
tween two diﬀerent protection diﬀerentiated classes utilizing dedicated path pro-
tection (Class A, 1:1/1+1) and shared path protection (Class B, 1:N). Preconﬁg-
uration of switches is the main diﬀerence between 1:1/1+1 and 1:N protection.
Since switches are not preconﬁgured, 1:N algorithm can allow sharing between
multiple protection paths as long as their working paths do not share a common
failure mode. Paths protected by the 1:1/1+1 scheme cannot share resources
with other 1:1/1+1 schemes because the switches must be preconﬁgured in order
to provide rapid recovery.
We assign protection resources such that resources can be shared between
protection paths if their working paths do not share common failure modes. 1:N,
Class B, protection paths can share resources with any other protection path(s).
In the optimized version of the sharing algorithm, a single Class A lightpath
can share a protection channel with any number Class B lightpaths. Switches
are then preconﬁgured to support recovery of the Class A lightpath, and when
needed, reconﬁgured to support recovery of Class B lightpaths.
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Figure 3.1: The National network.
Network S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
National
17414
(1.00)
18788
(1.079)
18862
(1.083)
22894
(1.315)
16000
(0.919)
25380
(1.457)
39000
(2.340)
Arpanet
11314
(1.00)
12270
(1.084)
12252
(1.083)
15164
(1.340)
10460
(0.925)
16334
(1.444)
26180
(2.314)
Cost 239
8286
(1.00)
8964
(1.082)
8944
(1.080)
10906
(1.316)
7660
(0.924)
11818
(1.426)
18480
(2.230)
Lata X
27004
(1.00)
29038
(1.075)
29360
(1.087)
35430
(1.312)
24840
(0.920)
39810
(1.474)
60140
(2.227)
NJ Lata
2134
(1.00)
2260
(1.059)
2294
(1.074)
2682
(1.257)
1920
(0.900)
2930
(1.373)
4460
(2.089)
Table 3.3: Total capacity cost for diﬀerent classiﬁcation schemes normalized to
class S1.
3.4 Evaluation
Figure 3.3 shows the results of on-line provisioning performed on the National
network (US Backbone with 24 nodes and 44 links, shown in Figure 3.1) with
the seven diﬀerent classiﬁcation schemes previously explained in section 3.B. Pro-
tection requirements for all Class A and B traﬃc can be met with 8.8%(S1) and
17.4%(S2) additional capaciy compared to S5,which employs all unprotected traf-
ﬁc. S6 and S7 requires over 148% additional capacity compared to S1. Note that
Class D traﬃc can be converted to class C traﬃc on S3 and S4 at no additional
cost in terms of capacity.
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Figure 3.2: Example Network
It is interesting to note that protection capacity on S1 is very close to protec-
tion capacity on S3. S3 consists of all Class B traﬃc, and therefore the are showing
that the sharing optimization allows enough sharing of protection resources be-
tween Class A and Class B traﬃc that the eﬃciency is equivalent to using all 1:N
protection. Figure 3.4 more directly shows the beneﬁt of the optimization. The
total traﬃc shown on Figure 3.4 is consistent with the demand used for results
on Figure 3.3. The ratio between Class A and Class B is varied from 0 to 100 to
show the optimization. At 33.3%, pointed by the arrows, the overall capacity cost
is improved by 7.9% as also shown in Table 3.3. We also measured the on-line
provisioning cost in terms of capacity using the classiﬁcation scheme provided in
[59]. All demands can be provisioned with an addition of less than1% capacity
over S5. The improvement comes from assuming that all unprotected traﬃc be-
long Class E (preemptable). Grouping all unprotected traﬃc to Class E is not
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Figure 3.3: On-line capacity provisioning results on the National network.
attractive because lightpaths provisioned under Class E are susceptible to failures
of other lightpaths.
We also simulated on-line provisioning using four other sample networks shown
in Figure 3.2. Table 3.3 shows the total capacity results for diﬀerent classiﬁcation
under each network. Results show that the beneﬁts of the diﬀerentiation via
protection classiﬁcation is consistent for the ﬁve sample networks used where S1
provides 7.4 to 8.4 percent improvement in capacity cost over S3.
Table 3.4 shows the average failure count of each class of traﬃc under diﬀerent
protection diﬀerentiated classiﬁcations. The average number of lightpaths that
are aﬀected by a single link failure (average link load) for each protection class is
also shown. Since recovery for Class C utilizes rerouting over existing protection
capacity, reducing capacity through sharing optimization reduces the available
resources for Class C. For S1, 91.0 out of 137.9 Class C lightpaths cannot be
rerouted whereas for S2, 45.3 out of 135.6 Class C lightpaths are left unrestored.
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S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
Class E
20.1
20.1
19.8
19.8
— — — — —
Class D
67.9
67.9
249.6
249.6
244.6
244.6
361.9
361.9
— — —
Class C
91.0
137.9
45.3
135.6
— — — — —
Class B
0
74.5
0
75.5
0
114.0
— —
0
376.0
—
Class A
0
38.6
0
36.4
—
0
109.2
— —
0
363.6
Table 3.4: Avg # of failed lightpaths / Avg. # of lightpaths aﬀected by a link
failure (avg. link load).
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3.5 Summary
A protection diﬀerentiated classiﬁcation scheme based on ﬁve protection classes
was proposed. We also introduced a novel sharing optimization method that
allows sharing of protection capacity between two diﬀerent classes of traﬃc. We
showed that using protection based classiﬁcation can reduce network capacity cost
by up to 130% on average over ﬁve sample networks. Results showed that about
8% additional capacity cost can be reduced by using our sharing optimization
under protection diﬀerentiated classiﬁcation.
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CHAPTER 4
Streams: Rapid and Eﬃcient Recovery
Algorithm
All-optical networks (AON) oﬀer several critical advantages over optically opaque
networks. Faster switching can be achieved with the absence of electronic and
photonic processing delays that can act as a bottleneck on the total transmission
time. At the same time, the absence of high-speed electronics may oﬀer a signif-
icant reduction in equipment costs. In addition, unlike opaque networks, TONs
can handle signals with diﬀerent data rates, protocols, and formats, making it
more suitable for supporting future changes. On the other hand, they suﬀer from
limited functionality in wavelength conversion, signaling capabilities and detailed
performance monitoring [23, 62]. These limitations reduce the eﬃciency of many
of the recovery schemes studied in the literature and make implementation more
challenging [63]. These issues, coupled with the fact that the impact of failures
in TONs is exacerbated by their high traﬃc volumes, necessitate a better under-
standing of the tradeoﬀs between diﬀerent survivability schemes. In considering
survivability options, understanding the tradeoﬀs between recovery speed, data
loss, capacity requirements, and the implementation overhead of diﬀerent protec-
tion schemes is imperative. Our goal then is to provide rapid failure recovery in
TONs in an eﬃcient manner, and reduce service disruptions and loss of data. In
this work, we evaluate diﬀerent protection algorithms and study their tradeoﬀs.
We also distinguish the diﬀerence between recovery speed and data loss and show
that backup path lengths have minimal impact on data loss.
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4.1 Diﬀerentiation of Recovery Time and Data
Loss
Although the primary metrics for evaluation of recovery algorithms have been
protection capacity requirements and speed of recovery, most studies in the liter-
ature do not distinguish between overall recovery time and the actual period of
data loss [9, 14]. Data loss occurs until the traﬃc is diverted to the backup path,
but recovery is complete until the backup traﬃc reaches the destination.
The time between a failure and initiation of recovery diﬀers among the schemes
discussed above. For link-based protection, failure detection requires approxi-
mately one link propagation delay, whereas path-based protection only reacts to
a failure after a propagation delay on about half of the whole path on average.
Since data is lost until backup traﬃc is sent out over the backup path, the total
period of data loss, therefore, includes both the time for detecting a failure and
the time it takes switch over to the backup path. As a result, more data is lost
with path protection relative to link protection, and more data is lost with shared
backup schemes that require signaling and switching of intermediate nodes after
the failure. With protection schemes such as generalized loopback and ﬂooding-
based mesh restoration, even though the backup capacity is shared, ﬂooding is
initiated immediately upon detection of a failure preventing further loss of data.
The Streams falls under the same category and this distinction is discussed in
detail for the context of our experiment in section 4.3.2.
4.2 Streams
We present a protection algorithm called Streams, which allows for rapid recovery
from all single link or single node failures, and is comparable to dedicated path
protection in terms of recovery speed while utilizing 10-35% less total capacity
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with non-dynamic traﬃc or signiﬁcantly increasing the number of connections a
network can support at a given blocking rate with dynamic traﬃc loads. The
Streams algorithm employs the same recovery protocol used for 1:1 (one-for-one)
dedicated path protection (DPP). Streams is powerful because it can also coex-
ist with other algorithms in the same network as it does not require additional
equipment support. It can readily be implemented on current networks that utilize
DPP or shared path protection (SPP). The Streams algorithm provides recovery
speed comparable to DPP or a ring-based protection scheme, but is more eﬃ-
cient in terms of capacity and blocking probability. Streams can achieve capacity
eﬃciency closer to SPP. SPP and Streams oﬀer an interesting tradeoﬀ between
capacity and backup path length. By adjusting the degree to which backup path
lengths can be extended, a network can be operated at diﬀerent points in the
space of capacity versus path length expansion.
The concept utilized by the Streams algorithm was independently developed
by the authors and introduced in the context of all-optical networks in [64] and by
another group in the context of OEO networks in [65]. Both papers present sim-
ple heuristics for link failure protection under non-dynamic routing scenarios. In
this work, we provide a much more detailed study of the tradeoﬀs between diﬀer-
ent well-known protection algorithms and introduce a simple heuristic for routing
dynamic traﬃc for Streams and show the performance tradeoﬀs on several well-
known networks. We also evaluate node failure scenarios in detail. We present the
relative performances in terms of capacity and backup path length expansion as
well as providing results that show diﬀerent operating points at which networks
can choose to utilize the diﬀerent protection algorithms. We found several inter-
esting phenomenas in the tradeoﬀs between diﬀerent protection algorithms, traﬃc
load and network topology. The details are provided in the results section. Finally,
we also formulate an integer linear programming (ILP) solution for Streams and
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evaluate capacity provisioning for static, oﬄine traﬃc to show that the Streams
protection scheme provides the same advantages for oﬄine provisioning.
4.2.1 Streams Protection Scheme
A B
C
B
DE
A
Figure 4.1: A) SPP setup B) Example of a Streams setup
We now present the Streams algorithm, which can be applied to any two-
node connected network (or two-edge connected network, if node failures are not
considered). Streams can be thought of as a virtually shared-DPP algorithm. It
is like DPP in the sense that all PXCs are preconﬁgured at the time a lightpath is
provisioned, and in the event of a failure, backup traﬃc is simply sent over the pre-
established backup path, termed a stream. Preconﬁguration enables the PXCs to
switch over to backup routes without performing any decision making in the event
of a failure, and aids our goal for rapid recovery. All PXCs along a stream are
preconﬁgured to simply forward the backup traﬃc along the reserved λ-channels
in a speciﬁc ingress to egress port setting (identical to 1:1 DPP). The mapping
from ingress ports to egress ports at intermediate PXCs is maintained in the
PXC conﬁgurations themselves, and is updated when lightpaths are provisioned
or torn down or in the event of a failure. Recovery with Streams is much faster
than with protection algorithms that use soft-reserved backup capacity (such as
SPP), as no signaling or conﬁguration of intermediate PXCs is required after a
failure. The key diﬀerence is that it allows sharing of a stream across diﬀerent
connections. Streams fall somewhere between DPP and SPP in terms of the
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existing classiﬁcation of survivability techniques. Each connection is protected
by a backup path, which must lie entirely on a single stream. The stream may
extend beyond the backup path in either direction. Backup paths that are on the
same stream cannot diverge. The top example in Figure 4.1 illustrates an SPP-
like solution, which allows diverging paths to share resources. In the example,
two backup paths are sharing a wavelength on link [A,B]. If a failure of one of
the two respective primaries fails, the end node for the failed primary will need
to signal the nodes along its backup so that the PXC’s are properly conﬁgured
to carry the backup traﬃc. In this example, without signaling, node B does not
know where to forward the backup traﬃc, and for the same reason, it cannot be
preconﬁgured as it can only forward data in one direction. Therefore, the backup
paths may not share wavelengths.
In Streams, sharing backup wavelengths is only allowed between backup paths
that do not diverge. The example shown on the bottom of Figure 4.1 is a pos-
sible setup under Streams protection. Here, three backup paths are shown with
wavelengths shared on links [B,C] and [C,D]. Detailed descriptions of how the
Streams protection scheme works are presented in the following sections. We show
that the constrained form of sharing in Streams still allows a signiﬁcant reduction
in capacity. Detailed results are presented in later sections.
In short, what makes Streams attractive is that the recovery protocol is ex-
tremely simple, and requires no additional hardware support (relate to DPP or
SPP). There is a small overhead in route computation, but the recovery proto-
col/implementation remains identical to 1:1 DPP. The remainder of this section
describes the failure detection and recovery process followed by our simple online
and dynamic Streams algorithms.
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Figure 4.2: Streams: PXC conﬁguration.
4.2.2 Failure Recovery Process
The failure detection-recovery initiation process is simple: for a given channel,
the PXC at the end of the lightpath detects a failure by monitoring the signal
quality on the channel (many metrics are possible [66]). For simplicity, we assume
bidirectional connections, which allows the receiver to initiate recovery as soon
as it detects a failure. When a failure is detected, the end-nodes immediately
redirect traﬃc to the assigned stream (preconﬁgured backup path). At the same
time, the two nodes reconﬁgure themselves to begin listening to the preassigned
ingress port for backup traﬃc. This reconﬁguration step does not add to the
recovery delay as it is performed simultaneously with redirection of the traﬃc.
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A node may also be both an end node (source or/and destination) for a con-
nection protected by a stream and an intermediate node for the same stream as
shown in Figure 4.2 (Node B is the end node for lightpath P1 and is also an
intermediate node along the stream protecting P1 and P2). In this case, after
the connection is recovered, the conﬁguration is ﬁxed preventing possible recon-
ﬁguration and signal collisions in the event of additional failures. The following
example illustrates the Streams setup and the recovery process.
In Figure 4.2, two connections P1(D −A− B) and P2(E − F − C) are pro-
tected by the stream D − E − B − C. On the ﬁgure, only single directions are
shown for presentation purposes. The intermediate nodes E and B along the
stream are preconﬁgured (similar to DPP) to simply forward traﬃc from D to B
and E to C respectively. Suppose either link [D,A] or [A,B] fails and disrupts
P1. Upon detecting a failure on P1, the source node, D, redirects traﬃc onto the
protection stream by simply sending out the traﬃc towards E. Intermediate nodes
on the protection stream—E and B—are conﬁgured to simply forward the traﬃc
along the stream. B (destination node), however, is also an end node for P1, and
therefore reconﬁgures itself to receive the traﬃc coming from E to the drop port
for P1 instead of forwarding it to C. The role of B and D are simply switched
for the traﬃc originating at B and terminating at D. The recovery process for a
failure on P2 is also shown in the ﬁgure. If there is a non-simultaneous multiple
failure, say, without loss of generality, a failure on P1 followed by a failure on P2,
it is clear that both connections cannot be recovered (the protection algorithm is
designed to handle single failures only). Nodes along the stream that are being
used for recovery will lock its conﬁguration (until the connection is restored) so
that it ignores future failures that may otherwise result in its usage. Therefore,
E knows that the stream is being used by P1 and does not attempt to send the
traﬃc for P2 over the stream (prevents switching on E). Note that the actual
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recovery process is identical to DPP, where post-failure switching takes place only
at the end nodes.
It is important to note that the Streams algorithm does not limit the detec-
tion process to the signal monitoring approach described. Other approaches that
allow quick detection and propagation of failure information to network nodes can
also be used, allowing existing networks to readily adopt the Streams protection
algorithm. For unidirectional connections, common recovery initiation techniques
used by other algorithms, such as DPP, can be used. Most importantly, the de-
tection time across the diﬀerent protection schemes are the same as long as the
same method is utilized.
4.2.3 Lightpath Provisioning
We assume that protection is not provided for source and destination node failures;
if such failures are handled at all (for any survivability technique), they generally
make use of redundant node hardware and redundant connections to the optical
network, both of which are orthogonal to the network recovery algorithm.
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Figure 4.3: A working example of the Streams protection scheme.
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The primary and backup paths for a connection must obey two constraints.
First, both paths must obey the wavelength continuity constraint, i.e., the same
wavelength must be used along the entire path. A pair of primary/backup paths
can, however, use diﬀerent wavelengths [67]. Second, for link failure protection,
primary and backup path pairs must be link disjoint, and node disjoint for node
failure protection.
A simple example of how Streams protection is set up is shown in Figure 4.3.
In the ﬁgure, there are a total of six connections provisioned on the network with a
single stream providing protection for all six connections. Solid lines with arrows
represent the stream with its preconﬁgured forwarding directions. The dashed
lines represent primary paths that are protected by this stream.
This example illustrates two subtle details about the Streams algorithm. First,
a stream may be shared across multiple connections that have common failure
modes. In other words, multiple connections that share a link (or a node) may
use the same stream for protection if these connections utilize diﬀerent parts of the
stream for protection. In the example, two connections are assigned on link [3-8],
and a failure on this link will simultaneously break the two connections. It is easy
to see that the two connections use diﬀerent parts of the stream. Second, a primary
path can share common failure modes with the stream providing protection as long
as the links or nodes they share are not needed for recovery. In the example, the
connection 2 to 8 shares a link ([4-8]) with the protection stream. Again, it is
clear from the example that the failure of link [4-8] does not aﬀect recovery of
connection 2 to 8.
In the next section, we utilize simple heuristics to set up Streams, and evaluate
the Streams algorithm using two online routing scenarios—non-dynamic provi-
sioning and dynamic provisioning. For both scenarios, a greedy approach is used
to perform a joint search for the best cost primary and backup path pairs for each
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connection request, assuming no knowledge of future requests. The details are
discussed in the following sections.
Non-dynamic Provisioning
For the non-dynamic provisioning scenario, the objective is to ﬁnd the optimal
primary and backup path pairs as connection requests arrive. An outline of three
functions are shown below. First, route establishes a connection between a source
(src) and destination (dst) pair. Shortest primary paths are used, and backup
path lengths depend on the parameter ex hop, which represents the number of
extra hops allowed for backup paths. Second, evaluate determines the cost of
a candidate primary and backup path pair and checks for its validity. It also
checks to see if an existing stream can be used or extended to save capacity.
Finally, update network allocates resources for the new connection and updates
the network status. The outline shown allocates connections such that they can
be recovered from all single link failures. Performing intersection on the PSB set
for nodes computes backup paths that cover all single node failures.
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– Note: A path is treated as an ordered set of links.
– P (src, dst) – Set of shortest primary paths for the node pair (src, dst)
This set is pre-computed.
– B(pi, h) – Ordered set of backup paths corresponding to pi ∈ P
sorted by length in ascending order from shortest length paths to
(shortest length + h) hop paths [pre-computed]
– S – Set of streams [initially empty]
– λ(s) – Wavelength used by stream s ∈ S [initially empty]
– Free(λ) – Set of free λ-channels on wavelength λ
(subset of the set of links). [available link capacity]
– PSB(s, l) – Allocated primaries that use the same backup resource(s) upon
failure.
link l on stream s (using λ(s)) is used for recovery if a link in
this set fails. In other words, this set contains all primary paths that are
protected by a part of s, including l.
– compatible (s, b) – Checks for compatibility between stream s and backup b
on λ(s). Speciﬁcally, this method checks for possible splits/merges
that may arise as a result of adding b to s.
– ﬁnd ﬁrst ﬁt wavelength (a) – Finds the lowest wavelength w where
path a ﬁts. For some existing w if a ⊂ Free(w) then λ(s)
is set to w. A new wavelength is allocated if a does not ﬁt in any of the
existing wavelengths.
evaluate (p, b) { //get compatible stream & cost
mincost ← |links| + 1
for all si ∈ S { //ﬁnd least cost stream
if (compatible (si, b)) {
cost← 0
valid← true
for all links lj ∈ b {
if ((p ∩ PSB(si, lj)) = not empty)
valid ← false
if (lj ∈ si)
cost← cost+ 1 }
if (valid AND cost < mincost) {
mincost ← cost
stream ← si
}}}
if (mincost = |links|+ 1) { //make new stream
stream ← b
mincost ← length(b) }
return [stream, mincost]
}
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update network capacity and streams information
update network (p, b, s) {
all links ← b ∪ s
new links ← b \ s
if (new links ⊂ Free(λ(s))) {
Free(λ(s)) ← Free(λ(s)) ∪ s
λ(s) ← ﬁnd ﬁrst ﬁt wavelength (all links)
for all links li ∈ b
PSB(s, li)← PSB(s, li) ∪ p
Free(λ(s))← Free(λ(s)) \ new links
s ← all links
}
route (src, dst, ex hop) {
mincost ← |links|+ 1
for all pi ∈ P (src, dst) { //consider all primaries
for all bj ∈ B(pi, ex hop) { //and all backups for it
[stream, cost] ← evaluate (pi, bj)
if (cost < mincost) {
mincost ← cost + length(pi)
p ← pi
b ← bj
s ← stream
}}}
update network (p, b, s)
}
Dynamic Provisioning
The dynamic provisioning scenario diﬀers from the non-dynamic provisioning pre-
sented in the previous section in that the number of wavelengths on each link is
limited, and therefore the objective is to achieve higher utilization by accepting
as many calls as possible. We assume dynamic connection arrival and departure,
and utilize a greedy selection of minimum cost primary and backup path pairs. If
the available resources are insuﬃcient to provision a call within its hop limit, the
call is blocked. Instead of simply imposing a maximum path length, we look at
bounding primary and backup paths separately based on the shortest path lengths
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(for the network graph) for each connection. This method is similar to how the
backup path lengths were limited in the non-dynamic provisioning scenario. The
advantage of using this method is that shorter paths are not favored in searching
for alternate paths during route computation.
The algorithm we used for our study is similar to the heuristic described in the
previous section. There are three key diﬀerences. First, the number of wavelengths
on each link is limited. Second, because the number of wavelengths are limited,
non-shortest primary paths are considered, and the number of additional hops
allowed is used as a parameter. Finally, unnecessary wavelengths are freed upon
connection departures.
A rough outline is shown below. When a call arrives, connection request at-
tempts to establish a primary and backup (on a stream) paths. The call is blocked
if the paths cannot be provisioned within its hop limit. This method checks for
compatible backup paths by using evaluate. If the connection can be provisioned,
update network updates the network resource information as well as the stream
information by allocating wavelengths to the primary and backup paths. Upon
departure of a call, remove connection updates the network resources and the
stream. This step involves freeing wavelengths from the primary path and parts
of the stream (if possible).
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– Note: A path is treated as an ordered set of links.
– c – Connection information that includes primary path, primary wavelength,
backup path, and the stream it utilizes
– P (src, dst, h) – Ordered set of primary paths for the node pair (src, dst)
sorted by length in ascending order from shortest length paths to
(shortest length + h) hop paths [pre-computed]
– B(pi, h) – Ordered set of backup paths corresponding to pi ∈ P
sorted by length in ascending order from shortest length paths to
(shortest length + h) hop paths [pre-computed]
– S – Set of streams [initially empty]
– s(c) – The stream used by connection c for protection [initially empty]
– L – Number of wavelengths per link [link capacity]
– λ(s) – Wavelength used by stream s ∈ S [initially empty]
– Free(w) – Set of free λ-channels on wavelength w
(subset of the set of links). [available link capacity]
– PSB(s, l) – Allocated primaries that use the same backup resource(s) upon
failure.
link l on stream s (using λ(s)) is used for recovery if a link in this set fails.
In other words, this set contains all primary paths that are protected by
a part of s, including l.
– compatible (s, b) – Checks for compatibility between stream s and backup
b on λ(s).
Speciﬁcally, this method checks for possible splits/merges that may arise
as a result of adding b to s.
– ﬁnd ﬁrst ﬁt wavelength (a) – Finds the lowest wavelength w < L where path
a ﬁts.
For some existing w if a ⊂ Free(w) then λ(s) is set to w.
Returns -1 if a cannot be allocated (insuﬃcient resources).
// handle changes due to accepted connection requests
update network (p, pλ, b, s) {
Free(pλ) ← Free(pλ) \ p
new links ← b \ s
Free(λ(s))← Free(λ(s)) \ new links
λ(s) ← ﬁnd ﬁrst ﬁt wavelength (all links)
for all links li ∈ b
PSB(s, li)← PSB(s, li) ∪ p
s ← b ∪ s
}
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connection request (src, dst, pri ex hop, bck ex hop) {
mincost ← |links|+ 1
for all pi ∈ P (src, dst, pri ex hop) { //consider all primaries
for all bj ∈ B(pi, bck ex hop) { //and all backups
if ((piλ ← ﬁnd ﬁrst ﬁt wavelength (pi)) > -1) {
[stream, cost] ← evaluate (pi, bj)
if (cost < mincost) {
mincost ← cost+ length(pi)
p ← pi
pλ ← piλ
b← bj
s ← stream
}}}}
if (mincost = |links|+ 1)
block call
else {
update network (p, pλ, b, s)
c← [p, pλ, b, s]
return c
}}
// handle changes due to connection departures
remove connection (c) {
[p, pλ, b, s] ← c
Free(pλ) ← Free(pλ) ∪ p
for all links li ∈ b {
PSB(s, li) ← PSB(s, li) \ p
if PSB(s, li) = empty
Free(λ(s))← Free(λ(s)) ∪ li
}}
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evaluate (p, b) { //get compatible stream & cost
mincost ← |links| + 1
for all si ∈ S { //ﬁnd least cost stream
if (compatible (si, b)) {
cost← 0
valid← true
for all links lj ∈ b {
if (((p ∩ PSB(si, lj)) = not empty)
or (lj ⊂ Free(λ(si))))
valid ← false
if (lj ∈ si)
cost← cost+ 1 }
if (valid AND cost < mincost) {
mincost ← cost
stream ← si
}}}
if (mincost = |links|+ 1) { //make new stream
temp ← ﬁnd ﬁrst ﬁt wavelength (b)
if (temp = -1)
block call
stream ← b
λ(stream) ← temp
mincost ← length(b) }
return [stream, mincost]
}
National
COST 239Arpanet COST−small
NSFNETNJ LATA
Figure 4.4: Networks used for evaluation.
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4.3 Evaluation of Protection Schemes
First, we discuss two protection algorithms (dedicated and shared path protec-
tion) that are used in evaluating the Streams algorithm. Second, we outline the
diﬀerence between recovery time and data loss for the diﬀerent algorithms. We
then present the simulation results from the online non-dynamic provisioning sce-
nario and the results from the dynamic provisioning scenario, followed by our
formulation of ILPs and results for oﬄine static provisioning. The overall results
follow our expectation in terms of the relative eﬃciencies in terms of capacity
utilization. Streams fall somewhere between SPP and DPP, but closer to SPP.
It is also important to understand that SPP will always be at least as eﬃcient
as Streams in terms of capacity utilization because every Streams solution can
always be used for SPP, but not all SPP solutions are applicable to Streams as
explained in the previous section. Computing each connection request in all of
the online routing scenarios for all protection schemes we studied took less than
a fraction of a second in the worst cases using a desktop equipped with AMD
Athlon 1.5Ghz processor and 512MB of RAM.
Six diﬀerent networks are used to evaluate the diﬀerent protection algorithms;
COST-small (11 nodes, 24 links), NJLATA (11,23), COST 239 (19,37) [68],
NATIONAL (24,44), ARPANET (20,32), NSFNET (14,20). These networks are
ordered by average node degrees from highest to lowest. The results provided in
this section are also presented in the same order.
4.3.1 Dedicated and Shared Path Protection
DPP oﬀers fast recovery with little or no data loss because no signaling is required
between the source and the destination nodes after the failure. 1+1 DPP actively
sends the backup traﬃc over the backup path, which is kept alive during the entire
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lifetime of a connection. With 1:1 DPP, the backup path is only used when there
is a failure, and therefore the backup path may be used to carry unprotected
traﬃc. The unprotected traﬃc can be dropped in the event of a failure. This
reuse makes 1:1 more eﬃcient than 1+1 in terms of capacity; the tradeoﬀ is the
added delay in the recovery process of the 1:1 DPP. Once the traﬃc is placed
on the 1:1 backup path, it takes about one propagation delay along the path to
reach the destination node. DPP is routed using shortest primary path and the
shortest corresponding backup path. DPP is easy to implement in AONs and
often is used [63].
In SPP, channels are chosen in advance, but not preconﬁgured. Instead, the
end nodes of a lightpath signal the intermediate nodes along its backup path to
conﬁgure the switches after the failure occurs. Because the switches are not con-
ﬁgured to forward traﬃc from/to speciﬁc nodes, capacity reserved for protection
can be shared among diﬀerent connections that do not share links in the primary
path. Protection capacity can also be used to carry arbitrary unprotected traﬃc.
The need to signal and conﬁgure intermediate switches renders SPP slow com-
pared to DPP, but SPP requires signiﬁcantly less capacity compared to DPP [19].
In simulating online routing, we use joint selection of link-disjoint primary and
backup lightpaths to minimize the capacity cost in a manner similar to [15].
In practice, the signaling necessary to dynamically conﬁgure the intermedi-
ate switches after a failure can make implementation of SPP more complicated
in AONs [63]. However, a simple implementation that leverages a bidirectional
signaling wavelength per link may be utilized to solve the problem with the ad-
ditional capacity of twice the number of links. Discussion of the details for such
implementation is outside the scope of this work, and for the results shown in this
work, this cost is ignored. Ignoring this detail results in a tiny reduction in the
cost for SPP, and does not aﬀect the relative tradeoﬀs highlighted in this work.
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Algorithms Failure detection Total recovery Data loss
SPP 10 ms 50 to 90 ms + δ 50 to 90 ms
Streams 10 ms 20 ms + δ 20 ms
DPP (1:1) 10 ms 20 ms + δ 20 ms
DPP (1+1) 10 ms 20 ms + δ 0 to 20 ms
Figure 4.5: Approximate data loss and recovery times. The δ terms denote the
propagation delay on the backup path, which may vary slightly between the dif-
ferent protection schemes, but has no eﬀect on data loss ﬁgures.
4.3.2 Recovery Time and Data Loss
We ﬁrst discuss recovery times and data loss (the time during which the network
loses data) for the diﬀerent algorithms. Recovery time is an important aspect of
designing and implementing a protection scheme, but data loss even more critical.
The numbers shown in Figure 4.5 are based on a few assumptions about the
time required for basic operations presented in [9]. First, failure detection by the
end nodes of a path takes about half of the propagation delay along the entire
primary path. Since we are looking at mostly shortest paths, these numbers
are the same for all three schemes we evaluate. For a reasonably large network,
[9] assumed, for simplicity, that the total propagation delay on a path is about
20 ms on average. Again, this time does not vary much between the diﬀerent
protection schemes. Next, switching a single PXC takes about 10 ms, which is
also consistent across the diﬀerent schemes. Finally, signaling and conﬁguration
(usually uploading of maps) of intermediate PXCs take about 40 to 80 ms in SPP.
For the 1+1 case of DPP, recovery completes when the receiving node detects
a failure and switches to the backup stream. With some eﬀort, the backup signal
can be delayed relative to the primary signal, allowing the receiver to avoid any
data loss. With 1:1 DPP, there is some data loss until the source node switches to
the backup path, and recovery is complete only after the data reach the destination
node. Often, a very small bandwidth, usually on a separate, out-of-band channel,
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is allocated for signaling as well as monitoring for failures. Forward and reverse
alarm messages can be used in case of a failure occurs on just one direction of
the bidirectional failure. If both directions fail, the end nodes can detect the
failure failure and switch to the backup path. These assumptions, based on [9],
are consistent across the diﬀerent protection schemes and does not change the
relative timing. Total data loss is thus roughly 20 ms with this approach, and
recovery time is longer by one propagation delay on the backup path. Since the
average backup path lengths may vary between diﬀerent protection algorithms,
we use the average hop count. Actual distances may provide exact timing ﬁgures,
but it is suﬃcient enough to use hop counts to see the relative timing eﬀects.
It is important to note that the backup path lengths have no eﬀect on data
loss. Streams has the same data loss and recovery time as the 1:1 DPP since
traﬃc is immediately switched over to the backup upon detection and at the
same time the receiving and starts to listen on the backup path. With SPP, the
PXC reconﬁguration (signaling and uploading of maps) costs dominate both data
loss and recovery time, bringing data loss to between 50 and 90 ms.
4.3.3 Non-dynamic, Online Provisioning
Our ﬁrst set of experiments are based on simulations of non-dynamic provisioning
with uniform full-mesh traﬃc demands. We assume that we have no knowledge
of future demands. Each connection is assumed to be bidirectional. We used 200
randomly selected orderings of the demands and report the mean value measured
over these orderings. The capacity results are shown with 98% conﬁdence intervals
in the Figure 4.12 and 4.13, but are omitted from the graph because at 98%
conﬁdence level, the mean values vary by less than 1%.
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To make a fair comparison, the same set of orderings is used in all experi-
ments. Total capacity is the primary metric used. We assign each λ-channel on
each link a cost of one when calculating capacity. The total capacity cost is there-
fore the sum of the number of λ-channels reserved for both primary and backup
paths. While, in practice, traﬃc demands may not be uniformly distributed, the
study of uniformly distributed demands suﬃces to illustrate the characteristics
of the diﬀerent protection algorithms for comparison purposes. This method is
consistent with other comprehensive online provisioning work found in the litera-
ture [19, 17]. Approaches such as design-based routing (DBR) [69] that use oﬄine
ILP optimization to provision for online allocation decisions may reduce overall
capacity requirements, but we do not expect that they will lead to substantial
changes in the relative costs of algorithms. Also, DBR can be applied to many
algorithm that shares protection resources including the algorithms evaluated in
this work.
Capacity vs. Average Backup Path Length
In this section, we report measurements based on shortest primary routing with
varying backup path lengths (starting from shortest backup path to backup paths
that are arbitrarily longer than the shortest backup path in single hop increments).
Path lengths are computed in terms of number of hops. We also present the
results using the average path length expansion ratio [30] (pl-expansion for short),
which provides more insight in terms of the penalty an algorithm pays due to
an increase in path lengths. Path length expansion ratio for a connection is
the ratio between the allocated backup path over the shortest path length for a
given source/destination pair. Average path length expansion ratio, then, is the
average over all connections. With shortest (robust) primary paths, pl-expansion
is also the average ratio between backup and primary paths for the link failure
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protection scenario. For the node failure protection scenario, however, there are
few cases where the shortest robust primary is diﬀerent from the shortest path in
the network.
Considering tradeoﬀs is in terms of path lengths is interesting because it pro-
vides an insight as to how much additional delay is introduced. In addition, in
the case of AONs, signal qualities as well as possible ampliﬁcation requirements
can be captured. One important issue, often overlooked, with extending paths
is that an increase in path lengths (of some number of hops or distance) more
greatly aﬀects shorter connections. Pl-expansion captures this eﬀect and provides
information about the actual penalty an algorithm may incur in optimizing for
capacity. The average path length measure does not show this eﬀect. For exam-
ple, in Figure 4.10, pl-expansion for Streams is lower than SPP even though the
average path length is higher for both NATIONAL and COST 239. This result
shows that in SPP connections with shorter paths were assigned to longer paths
more often compared to Streams (to allow better use of protection capacity).
Link Failure Protection
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show capacity requirements and average path lengths for dif-
ferent networks and algorithms conﬁgured to handle all single link failures (node
failure coverage is discussed in the following section). Results corresponding to
shortest primary paths, and shortest backup (+0 hop) and arbitrary length backup
(N-hop) solutions are shown. Figure 4.6 shows total capacity normalized to that of
DPP. Evaluation results show the relative eﬃciency between diﬀerent algorithms.
SPP and Streams incur a small overhead in path length expansion, with a sig-
niﬁcant reduction in capacity compared to DPP. Our results conﬁrm that SPP is
the most capacity-eﬃcient (well understood in the literature). Streams provides
faster recovery and minimal loss with a small capacity overhead compared to SPP.
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Figure 4.6: Total capacity normalized to DPP with shortest primary paths for
link failure protection.
Figure 4.8 shows total capacity (normalized to best SPP solution) and the
pl-expansion. SPP and Streams can be operated with ﬂexibility in terms of these
two measures by varying the maximum allowed backup path lengths. We use
the number of additional hops compared to the shortest possible backup path to
control the tradeoﬀ between capacity and pl-expansion. The full range of solutions
from shortest backup (+0 Hop) to arbitrary length backup (N-hop) is shown.
The lowest (and right most) data points for each algorithm represent +0 hop
solutions with single hop increments to the maximum allowed backup path length
shown to the left in series. Naturally, diﬀerent networks and algorithms have
diﬀerent number of data points as the eﬀect of allowing extra hops for backup
paths plateaus at diﬀerent points. The top most data point corresponds to N-hop
solutions (where N may vary for diﬀerent networks and algorithms). The same
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Network [node deg.] Primary
DPP, SPP &
Streams (+0 hop)
SPP
(N-hop)
Streams
(N-hop)
COST-small [4.36] 1.60 2.27 (1.58) 2.99 (2.10) 3.12 (2.20)
NJLATA [4.18] 1.75 2.31 (1.49) 2.68 (1.73) 2.65 (1.70)
COST 239 [3.89] 2.24 3.16 (1.53) 3.81 (1.88) 4.04 (2.02)
NATIONAL [3.67] 2.90 4.17 (1.59) 5.20 (2.05) 5.70 (2.31)
ARPANET [3.20] 2.75 4.14 (1.75) 4.90 (2.15) 5.58 (2.54)
NSFNET [2.86] 2.20 3.73 (2.03) 4.11 (2.25) 4.52 (2.55)
Figure 4.7: Average backup path lengths in hops with shortest primaries. PL-
expansion numbers are shown inside the parentheses.
scales are used for all graphs in this ﬁgure to aid in visual comparison for the
diﬀerent algorithms and networks. Note that the DPP results for COST-small
and NSFNET are oﬀ the graph. These ﬁgures represent the operating points for
the diﬀerent protection schemes.
For DPP, only shortest backup solutions are presented, as increasing backup
path lengths only increases capacity. The pl-expansion value for DPP reﬂects an
absence of disjoint shortest paths for many pairs. For most networks, allowing
one or two extra hops in the backup substantially reduces capacity without sig-
niﬁcantly increasing pl-expansion. This phenomenon is somewhat intuitive given
that the possible choices for paths between two nodes increase exponentially with
increased maximum allowed length. Our experiments showed that allowing longer
primary paths slightly improve each algorithm in terms of capacity due to the in-
crease in the number of candidate primary and backup path pairs, but does not
signiﬁcantly change the relative results between diﬀerent algorithms.
Node Failure Protection
Figure 4.9 shows the total required capacity (normalized to DPP) and Figure 4.10
shows the path lengths (and pl-expansion) for the diﬀerent protection algorithms
with node protection. SPP and Streams both incur some capacity overhead when
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Figure 4.8: Operating points for the diﬀerent algorithms: Normalized capacity
and pl-expansion. The lowest points represent shortest (+0 hop) backup with
data points corresponding to additional hops from the shortest.
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node failures are considered. The overhead shown by our results is expected as
there are fewer number of node-disjoint paths compared to link-disjoint paths,
which limits the number of choices for primary and backup path pairs. Figure
4.11 shows the operating points for the diﬀerent algorithms. The results closer
together and capacity gap between SPP and Streams is smaller.
With the added overhead, diﬀerences between the algorithms are smaller com-
pared to link failure results. Backup path lengths tend to be shorter compared
to the link failure scenario (except for the +0 hop case) because more candidate
paths were present in the link failure scenario, and the longer candidates were
often chosen to optimize for capacity.
Conﬁdence Intervals
Figures 4.12 and 4.13 show 98% conﬁdence intervals computed using standard
statistical methods with 200 random samples used to generate non-dynamic, on-
line routing results in the previous sections. As stated previously, the numbers
vary by much less than 1%. Note that DPP results are always the same when
minimizing capacity-cost as shortest primary and backup path pairs result in the
lowest cost pair for each connection.
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Figure 4.9: Total capacity normalized to DPP with shortest primary paths for
link and node failure protection.
Network [node deg.] Primary
DPP, SPP &
Streams (+0 hop)
SPP
(N-hop)
Streams
(N-hop)
COST-small [4.36] 1.60 2.27 (1.58) 2.66 (1.89) 2.45 (1.70)
NJLATA [4.18] 1.75 2.31 (1.49) 2.41 (1.57) 2.36 (1.52)
COST 239 [3.89] 2.24 3.25 (1.56) 3.61 (1.78) 3.65 (1.76)
NATIONAL [3.67] 2.92 4.15 (1.58) 4.63 (1.83) 4.72 (1.82)
ARPANET [3.20] 2.75 4.15 (1.75) 4.64 (2.03) 4.92 (2.13)
NSFNET [2.86] 2.20 3.73 (2.03) 4.01 (2.22) 4.18 (2.32)
Figure 4.10: Average backup path lengths in hops with shortest primaries. PL-
expansion numbers are shown inside the parentheses.
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Figure 4.11: Operating points for the diﬀerent algorithms: Normalized capacity
and pl-expansion. The lowest points represent shortest (+0 hop) backup with
data points corresponding to additional hops from the shortest.
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Network [node deg.] DPP
Streams (0-hop)
N-hop
SPP (0-hop)
N-hop
COST-small [4.36] 426
316.32±0.73
278.32±1.05
259.71±0.68
239.35±0.55
NJLATA [4.18] 446
387.34±0.53
366.21±0.73
351.28±0.55
337.57±0.56
COST 239 [3.89] 1870
1567.57±1.36
1452.38±1.91
1394.76±1.34
1329.59±1.17
NATIONAL [3.67] 3902
3247.75±2.27
2963.86±3.30
2924.28±1.88
2794.28±2.02
ARPANET [3.20] 2614
2101.78±2.13
1882.24±2.85
1842.03±1.90
1782.95±1.96
NSFNET [2.86] 1078
825.89±1.62
754.01±2.16
684.42±1.07
666.69±1.03
Figure 4.12: Total capacity from online provisioning for link failures. 98% conﬁ-
dence intervals are shown for 0-hop and N-hop solutions. DPP cost is always the
same since the shortest path pairs yield the lowest cost.
Network [node deg.] DPP
Streams (0-hop)
N-hop
SPP (0-hop)
N-hop
COST-small [4.36] 426
341.52±0.56
337.35±0.65
333.08±0.75
323.59±0.65
NJLATA [4.18] 446
402.43±0.43
400.23±0.46
400.33±0.51
396.01±0.56
COST 239 [3.89] 1874
1675.44±0.95
1618.32±1.45
1598.47±1.44
1554.54±1.31
NATIONAL [3.67] 3902
3533.72±1.55
3381.50±2.19
3322.94±2.77
3223.67±3.11
ARPANET [3.20] 2618
2172.51±1.94
2054.50±2.65
2034.10±2.26
1993.64±2.27
NSFNET [2.86] 1078
878.29±1.58
841.38±1.75
824.20±1.24
804.52±1.31
Figure 4.13: Total capacity from online provisioning for link and node failures.
98% conﬁdence intervals are shown for 0-hop and N-hop solutions. DPP cost is
always the same since the shortest path pairs yield the lowest cost.
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4.3.4 Dynamic Provisioning
Our second set of experiments is based on simulations of dynamic provisioning.
We consider a dynamic call-by-call system with Poisson arrivals and exponential
call durations. We simulated the protection schemes using 16 wavelengths per
link, with 8 wavelengths going in each direction. Again, we assume that we have
no knowledge of future demands, and that each connection is bidirectional. The
primary metric for the dynamic provisioning simulations is blocking probability,
and is measured over varying loads (product of the average arrival rate and the
average call duration). We let each simulation run long enough to reach steady
state, where the overall number of connections routed is greater than 40000 and
up to 240000. The main diﬀerence from the non-dynamic provisioning scenario
is that wavelength availability varies with time, and shortest primaries may not
be available in many cases. We report measurements based on varying primary
and backup path lengths by allowing up to two extra hops from the shortest
path. Overall, the results are exactly as expected and consistent from studying
the non-dynamic model and the relative tradeoﬀs are also as expected. Details
are provided in the following sections.
Link Failure Protection
Figure 4.14 shows blocking probabilities for varying loads for the networks, and
Figure 4.15 shows the path lengths when considering link failure protection only.
Blocking probabilities are measured to 5% blocking, and path lengths are mea-
sured to whatever the maximum load is at 5% blocking for each network using
the three protection schemes. In all cases, the SPP algorithm performs best in
terms of call blocking, as expected.
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The general trend in all of the networks is that Streams sits somewhere in
between DPP and SPP in terms of call blocking. Both Streams and SPP pay a
small penalty in terms of path lengths. At 5% call blocking, on average, Streams
can support about 27% more traﬃc compared to DPP and SPP can support 50%
more compared to DPP.
Some interesting trends are shown in Figure 4.15. The trend in path length
as a function of load for the COST-small network diﬀers from that of the other
networks. SPP backup lengths sharply increase then slowly drop while the pri-
maries show an upward trend with a slightly sharper change at 30 Erlangs. At
ﬁrst, SPP is able to share resources by selecting longer paths (both primary and
backup). Streams also has longer backup paths compared to DPP. Together with
the large gap in the blocking probability at the bottom of the curve in the graph
shown in Figure 4.14, the results show that both Streams and SPP are able to
optimize for load even when the network is sparsely loaded. Longer paths allow
the algorithms to better search for shared resources by extending the search space,
thereby allowing the algorithm to minimize resource usage.
The backup path lengths for SPP start to drop at around 15 Erlangs. This ef-
fect is due to the fact that there are more resources already allocated to protection
when connection requests arrive. The abundance of allocated protection capacity
equates to more available resources for sharing. The primary lengths for SPP
start to increase almost exactly at the point where we start to see some blocking,
at 30 Erlangs. This trend is a result of the algorithm choosing longer primary
paths to avoid blocking as the number of free wavelengths start to decrease with
an increase in load. The sharp rises for Streams primary (at load 40+) and DPP
backup (at load 20+) are due to congestion where longer paths are chosen to
route around the congested links. The sharp increase occurs at loads where call
blocking goes over 5%.
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Figure 4.14: Single link failure protection. Blocking probability vs. traﬃc load
(Erlangs).
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Figure 4.15: Single link failure protection. Primary and backup path lengths
(normalized to the average shortest path length) vs. traﬃc load (Erlangs).
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Path length results for the other networks show less pronounced changes with
the degree of change dependent on average node degree. There are more paths in
networks with higher average node degree, and algorithms can more dynamically
adapt to varying loads as the number of candidate paths increases. The primary
path lengths for DPP starts to decrease slightly at 12 Erlangs for ARPANET. This
result falls in the range where the load is suﬃciently high with higher congestion
where shorter paths are less likely to be blocked compared to longer paths. This
eﬀect occurs for all networks given suﬃciently high loads, but is not visible in the
ranges shown for the networks except for the case of DPP on ARPANET.
Node and Link Failure Protection
Figures 4.16 and 4.17 show the simulation results for the diﬀerent algorithms when
considering single link and node failures. Similar to the results from the previous
section, Streams’ blocking performance fall between DPP and SPP.
The main diﬀerence between these results and the results from the previous
section is that the two shared protection schemes (Streams and SPP) perform less
eﬃciently as there are fewer path choices. This is due to the fact that there are
usually fewer node disjoint paths in a network than link disjoint paths (especially
when the network is not sparse).
The graphs are plotted on the same scale as the ones from the previous section
to aid in visual comparison of the two scenarios. DPP results are not signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by considering node failures. Considering node failure protection pushes
both shared algorithms closer to DPP.
The slope of the changes in path length is strongly related to the slope of the
graphs shown in the blocking probability versus load plot. This phenomenon is
true for relatively low network loads (at 5% or less blocking in this case). When
fewer resources are available, longer paths are considered in an eﬀort to route
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Figure 4.16: Single link and node protection. Blocking probability vs. traﬃc load
(Erlangs).
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Figure 4.17: Single link and node protection. Primary and backup path lengths
(normalized to the average shortest path length) vs. traﬃc load (Erlangs).
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around blocked wavelengths. Once the network becomes more heavily loaded,
the algorithms tend to favor shorter paths. This trend is not clear in the results
shown because the graphs only show relatively small loads.
4.4 Protecting Mission Critical Traﬃc With
Streams
In [70], classiﬁcation of traﬃc based on diﬀerent survivability requirements for
the Department of Defense was speciﬁed to allow more ﬂexible and eﬃcient op-
eration of optical networks, and to reduce this cost. Similar work in survivability
based service classiﬁcation that aims at reducing overall cost by diﬀerentiating
services based on the level of reliability required by diﬀerent classes of traﬃc can
be found in [71, 59]. However, high-priority, mission critical traﬃc requires mini-
mal downtime in the event of failures and utilizing dedicated protection to solve
this problem can still be expensive and may adversely aﬀect the available budget
(and often a compromise is made by utilizing cheaper protection schemes that are
slower with more data loss) [70].
Given that Streams oﬀers rapid-recovery and that it can co-exist in the net-
work with other standard protection schemes (such as dedicated or shared path
protection), it serves as a good candidate for allowing service diﬀerentiated opera-
tion of networks similar to the methods outlined in [70, 71, 59] without additional
equipment. Dynamic provisioning, as discussed in [71], is attractive because it
allows ﬂexible setup and tear down of connections as communication needs vary
and is going to play a key role in how future networks are operated. However, for
high-priority connections, it may be essential to perform more static allocation
of resources to guarantee not only reliable services, but also stable, non-blocking
communication. With the goal of minimizing capacity cost while providing fast
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recovery (with small data loss), we present an attractive and practical solution
using an optimized version of Streams .
In this section, we introduce a novel capacity optimization technique for use
in provisioning high-priority traﬃc. We ﬁrst introduce an integer linear program-
ming (ILP) based optimization technique to minimize capacity cost. We then
present a novel heuristic to reduce the problem space and show that our heuristic
is eﬀective in achieving its goal. Simulation results show that protection cost can
be reduced by a signiﬁcant amount (36% or more) using our technique.
4.4.1 Capacity Cost Optimization
We now present our optimization technique based on an ILP formulation and
also present our stream selection heuristic. For static traﬃc demands, protection
capacity provisioning for Streams can be optimized by solving an ILP problem.
In this section, we ﬁrst present the ILP formulation and address several practical
issues in ﬁnding optimal solutions. The protection capacity sharing optimization
problem is in general diﬃcult to solve as the problem space grows exponentially
given the number of choices of backup paths for each connection. For practi-
cal applications, limiting this choice to few shortest backup paths while utilizing
shortest primary paths has been proposed in the past [10]. Shared protection
schemes are less constrained in the way backup paths need to be arranged com-
pared to Streams, and therefore can relatively eﬃciently utilize the technique
mentioned above. However, from our experience in working with Streams in the
context of online routing, we noticed that allowing longer backup paths allowed
for a greater reduction in capacity cost relative to shared protection. This phe-
nomenon is true also for slower shared protection schemes, but they are aﬀected
much less by it due to their ﬂexibility in sharing.
100
To address this problem, we utilize an approach that is somewhat opposite
what has been done in the past—in the context of Streams, instead of merging
backup paths into streams, we start with some number of streams and ﬁt backup
paths onto them. This approach also can suﬀer from the same problem as the
number of possible streams (paths and cycles in a network) can be huge depending
on the network. However, using our Q-stream selection algorithm, we are able to
determine the potential eﬃciency of the streams and limit the problem by utilizing
only a small percentage of the total number of the streams. This technique is
presented later in the section.
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Figure 4.18: (a) Simple path-stream. (b) Simple cycle-stream. (c) Complex cycle-
stream. (d) Complex path-stream.
In a simple graph (i.e., there is at most one edge between any two nodes),
there are four types of streams—simple paths and cycles (nodes are repeated at
most once for paths and at most once for all nodes except for the start/end node
for cycles), and complex paths and cycles (nodes may be visited many times)—
as shown in Figure 4.18. Whether a stream is simple or complex is determined
by the topology of the subgraph that is induced by the stream. We denote a
stream simple if and only if the induced subgraph is either a simple path or
a simple cycle. The number of paths and cycles can also quickly grow as the
network size and complexity grows, but in practice it is relatively easy to ﬁnd
for backbone network topologies. However, ﬁnding all complex streams adds a
signiﬁcant amount of complexity to this problem. In this work, we only utilize
simple streams.
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4.4.2 ILP Formulation
E set of edges in the network.
W set of available λ-channels on each edge.
P set of primary paths. p ∈ P, p ⊆ E
S set of streams. s ∈ S, s ⊆ E
Fp feasible set for each primary path p ∈ P . Fp ⊂ S contains all streams that
can be used to protect path p ∈ P .
Fs feasible set for each stream s ∈ S. Fs = {p ∈ P | s ∈ Fp}
CSe set of tuples of conﬂicting streams. Streams that use edge e. CSe ≡ {s ∈
S | e ∈ s}. They cannot be assigned to the same wavelength.
C set of tuples ({p1, p2, . . . , pn}, s) of primary paths incompatible on stream s.
Basically, the same stream s cannot be used to restore all of these primaries.
The elements of C are in P(P ) × S s.t. ∀c ∈ C, c = (π, s), π ⊆ Fs. By
deﬁnition, ({p}, s) is not a member of the set C, given p ∈ Fs. ({p1, p2}, s) ∈
C means that p1 and p2 cannot utilize the same stream s, even though they
are individually compatible with and can use s s.t. p1, p2 ∈ Fs. Similarly,
({p1, p2, p3}, s) ∈ C says that the three primary paths cannot share the
same stream s even if any two of them can. This deﬁnition can be extend to
any number of primaries. A detailed discussion on how to ﬁnd these sets is
provided in the next section and is the key to this optimization technique.
lens length of the stream s (in hops), which is simply the number of λ-channels
required to allocate s.
Xwps indicator for association between a primary path and a stream. It is a binary
variable that is set to 1 if stream s allocated on wavelength w is used to
protect the primary path p and 0 otherwise.
Ysw indicator for allocation of a stream. It is a binary variable that is set 1 if
stream s is allocated on wavelength w and 0 otherwise.
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The objective is to minimize the total cost for allocating protection capacity
using Streams. Note that we assume that each λ-channel has a cost of one, but
the cost can be easily modiﬁed otherwise by replacing lens with an appropriate
cost function. Ultimately, the solution to the ILP returns a set of Ysw’s such that
all primaries are covered with minimum total capacity cost.
Minimize
∑
s∈S
∑
w∈W
lensYsw (4.1)
It is subject to the following constraints. The ﬁrst constraint enforces that
each primary path is assigned to one and only one stream for backup.
∀p ∈ P,
∑
s∈Fp
∑
w∈W
Xwps = 1 (4.2)
Each stream is considered occupied if at least one primary path has been
assigned to it. The binary variable enforces that such assignment is only counted
once when multiple primary paths utilize the same stream. Note that the objective
function rules out solutions for which Ysw = 1 and all X
w
ps are 0 for some s, w pair.
For all p ∈ P, s ∈ S,w ∈W ,
Ysw ≥ Xwps (4.3)
Next, conﬂicting primaries incompatible with a stream cannot be allocated on
the same λ-channel of that stream. Given a set of conﬂicting primaries and a
stream s, s should not be used by all of the primaries in the set. At most n − 1
connections can share the same stream, where n is the number of total primaries
in the set. Note that it does not imply that any strict subset of the primaries
is incompatible with the given stream. A subset of the primaries can share the
stream if this subset and the stream are not in the set C.
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∀({p1, p2, . . . , pn}, s) ∈ C, w ∈W ,
Xwp1s +X
w
p2s + · · ·Xwpns ≤ n− 1 (4.4)
Conﬂicting streams that have any edge(s) in common cannot utilize the same
λ-channel for any of their edges. In other words, each wavelength can only be
assigned to at most one of the streams in the conﬂicting set.
∀e ∈ E,w ∈W ,
∑
s∈CSe
Ysw ≤ 1 (4.5)
Wavelength continuity constraints is implicitly satisﬁed by the use of the bi-
nary variables. Allocation of each stream is done on a per-wavelength basis instead
of allocating capacity on a per-edge basis. This constraint forces all edges on the
stream to utilize the same wavelength.
4.4.3 Finding the Incompatibility Set C
In most cases, a single stream can protect multiple primary paths individually
(i.e., all primaries in Fs are protected by s). However, not all primaries in |Fs|
can be protected simultaneously by s. A set of primaries that can share stream
s simultaneously are said to be compatible (formal deﬁnition is provided in the
Appendix). Determining the compatibility of a stream for sets of primaries is
important for solving the ILP.
Figure 4.19(a) illustrates a simple set of two primaries that are compatible.
The two primaries 0-1-4-5 and 2-1-4-3 can both be protected simultaneously by
the stream shown in solid gray curve. This stream can protect the two primaries
under any single link failure, including the common edge (1,4) since they utilize
diﬀerent parts of the stream. However the primaries shown in Figure 4.19(b) are
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Figure 4.19: (a) Two compatible primaries. (b) Incompatible primaries. (c)
Incompatible primaries.
note compatible, as the failure of edge (1,4) requires the two primaries to utilize
the same part of the stream. The stream shown in Figure 4.19(c) cannot protect
the three primaries (0-4-6, 1-4-6 and 1-4-3) together even though they are pair-
wise compatible. In other words, any two combination of the three primaries can
be simultaneously protected by the stream, but not all three can be protected.
It is possible to ﬁnd all incompatible set C for each stream s by checking the
compatibility of all subsets of primaries in Fs. For each subset, an exhaustive
search can be performed recursively. Since a compatible set must have all its
subsets compatible, a bottom up approach can be used with memoization to keep
track of the states of the subsets. First, for every pair of primary paths in Fs,
we check the pair-wise compatibility on the stream. If they are not compatible,
the set is added to C. If at least one two-primary combination passes the check,
we can check the compatibility of every three primary combination that includes
this two-primary combination that passed the check. The same step is repeated
for all combinations of primaries. The number of primary paths a single stream
can protect is at most |E|, but in practice this number is smaller. However, the
search space can still grow rapidly when the set size is large. This naive approach
requires O(2k), k = |Fs| ≤ |E| checks in the worst case.
For simple streams we found that, for compatibility checks of a set of primaries
R ⊂ Fs, |R| > 3, checking all subsets T ⊂ R, |T | ≤ 3 is suﬃcient. Therefore,
after checking all 2 and 3 combinations of primaries in Fs, a set of primaries of
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size 4 or greater is compatible with the stream if and only if any subset of size 3 is
compatible. This result directly follows Theorem 1 presented in the next section
along with a proof. By using this property of simple streams, the complexity can
be reduced to polynomial O(k3).
4.4.4 Proof of Simple Streams Property
In this section we show that checking compatibility for sets up to size 3 is suﬃcient
for simple streams (i.e., streams formed from simple paths or cycles). Let s be a
simple stream.
Deﬁnition 1 (Primary conﬂict). Two primary paths are said to conflict if
they have an edge in common, and therefore can fail simultaneously when that
edge fails.
Deﬁnition 2 (Backup path). A backup path (BP ) of primary path p on stream
s is a segment U ⊂ s of the stream that connects the two end points of p. The set
of BP ’s for p is denoted BPp.
Lemma 1. Any primary path p ∈ Fs has exactly one BP on stream s, if s is a
not a cycle.
Lemma 2. Any primary p ∈ Fs has exactly two BP on stream s, if s is a cycle.
Deﬁnition 3 (Assignment). Given a simple stream s and given a multi-set R
of primary paths, R ⊆ Fs, an assignment for R is a function associating each path
p ∈ R with one of its backup paths on s.
Deﬁnition 4 (Active backup path). An active backup path (ABP ) for primary
path p is the BP chosen for protection use among all paths in BPp; ABPp.
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Deﬁnition 5 (Compatible). A multi-set R of primary paths is said to be com-
patible on s if and only if there exists an assignment of active backup paths for all
primary paths in such that for any pair of conflicting primaries, the active backup
paths assigned to these two primary paths are disjoint.
Deﬁnition 6 (Compatible Assignment). Given a stream s consisting of a
simple path (not a cycle), and a multi-set R of primary paths, R ⊆ Fs, with
|R| > 2, R is compatible on s if and only if for any subset T ⊂ R, |T | = 2, T is
compatible on s. Since each path has exactly one BP , assignment is unique and
induced assignment has same compatibility.
Theorem 1. Given a stream s consisting of a simple cycle and a multi-set R of
primary paths, R ⊆ Fs, with |R| > 3, R is compatible on s if and only if for any
subset T ⊂ R, |T | = 3, T is compatible on s.
Proof. Assume R is compatible on s. Then, there exists a compatible assignment
of R on s. Let T ⊂ R, |T | = 3, and consider the assignment induced on T by such
compatible assignment of R on S. If the induced assignment is not compatible,
there exists two conﬂicting primary paths p1, p2 ∈ T such that the BP ’s assigned
to p1 and p2are not disjoint. But, T ⊂ R, so p1, p2 ∈ R and the original assignment
of R on s is also not compatible (Contradiction). Thus, T is compatible on s.
Assume ∀T ⊂ R, |T | = 3, T is compatible on s. Now assume that R is not
compatible on s. We will construct a set T of three paths such that T is not
compatible on s. There must exist some path p1 ∈ R such that all of p1’s BP’s
overlap with some other conﬂicting path in R for any assignment. p1 has exactly
two BP’s on s. If every path p ∈ R has a BP that does not conﬂict with any other
BP for any path in R, assigning the non-conﬂicting BP to each path produces a
compatible assignment (contradiction). Thus, there exists some p1 ∈ R such that
both of its BP’s conﬂict with BP’s for some other path in R.
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Figure 4.20: (a)both backup paths of two primaries crossing (b) compatible as-
signment (c) incompatible assignment
Let p2 ∈ R conﬂict with p1. There must exist an assignment of backup paths to
p1, p2 so that there is no crossing between their ABP ’s. Figure 4.20(a) illustrates
the case where there is a crossing between the pair, and just the two primaries
are not compatible. Therefore, the assignment must be in some general form
of the example illustrated in Figure 4.20(b), where only one of the two backup
path is viable for a compatible assignment due to the conﬂict between p1 and
p2. Now let p3 ∈ R conﬂict with p1, where p3 may or may not conﬂict with p2.
Again, there must exist an assignment of backup paths to p1, p3 so that there
is no crossing to allow p1 and p3 to be compatible on s. Again, the assignment
must be as illustrated in Figure 4.20(c) and no viable backup paths exist. Thus,
T = {p1, p2, p3} is not compatible on s.
4.4.5 Stream Selection and Q-streams Heuristic
The ILP solution time depends strongly on the number of streams considered.
Thus we tried to eﬃciently reduce this number without impacting solution quality.
After ﬁnding all streams in a network, we ﬁrst to discard streams that do not
provide protection for any primary paths for the given traﬃc demand. Streams
that are left after this step are called valid streams. However, given a reasonable
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number of connections in the problem set, this step does not eliminate a signiﬁcant
number of streams.
If the total number of streams is large, we utilize the metric shown in Equation
6 to determine the quality of each stream and use a subset of streams called Q-
streams based on their computed quality (Q).
Qs =
1
lens
⎛
⎝ |Fs|∑
i=1
i2vs,i
⎞
⎠ (4.6)
where vs,i is the number of compatible sets of size i in Fs. Our metric basically
measures how many combinations of primaries in Fs a stream can protect with
more weight given to compatible sets with higher number of primaries.
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Figure 4.22: Q-stream eﬃciency
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Three of the ﬁve networks shown in Figure 4.21 were small enough to allow
the ILP to complete with all simple streams as input in a short amount of time
(less than about an hour using the CPLEX software on HP Blade servers with
AMD Opteron 2000 series processors and 2GB of RAM). The total number of
simple streams are shown on the left in Figure 4.22 for all ﬁve networks. The
right side of the ﬁgure shows the eﬃciency of our Q-stream selection heuristic.
The horizontal axis represents the fraction of the total number of simple streams
with the highest Q values used as input to our ILP, and the vertical axis represents
protection capacity cost normalized to the optimal case where all simple streams
were used. We also added the shortest backup paths to the set of streams used
for the ILP when the shortest backup paths are not already included by using the
Q-stream selection. This method allows the ILP to ﬁnd more eﬃcient solutions
using a small fraction as it has the freedom to leave out some connections while
attempting to protect as much primaries as possible with longer streams. The
connectivity of NJLATA network is much higher compared to the vBNS and
NSFNET networks, and the performance of Q-streams is better for NJLATA. For
all cases, however, it shows that the Q-streams heuristic is eﬃcient in reducing
the problem size while allowing the solver to ﬁnd very good solutions.
4.4.6 Summary of Results
We used ﬁve well-known networks, shown in Figure 4.21, that are representative of
optical backbone network topologies. 20 diﬀerent provisioning scenarios for each
network consisting of 30 randomly selected bi-directional connections for each sce-
nario were performed. We used shortest robust primary paths—when topological
shortest paths do not have a disjoint path, the shortest of paths that have disjoint
paths must be used. vBNS required the use of shortest robust primaries that are
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Table 4.1: Simulation Results.
vBNS NSFNET ARPANET COST NJLATA
node deg. 2.83 2.86 3.20 3.89 4.18
# streams 1209 7370 198013 552105 9510
# valid
streams
993
±35.9
6169.1
±270.2
136172.1
±7614.1
376984.2
±24301.4
8740.0
±141.2
# streams
used for ILP
993
±35.9
6169.1
±270.2
@5%
6837.7
±380.6
@2%
7568.6
±485.9
8740.0
±141.2
Capacity Cost
Primary only
149.8
±5.3
128.4
±3.0
170.2
±6.4
135.4
±3.6
106.8
±2.5
1:1 dedicated
protection
240.6
±8.1
221.8
±3.5
250.6
±6.9
194.2
±4.1
139.4
±2.7
Streams
Greedy +0
201.2
±9.7
159.6
±5.6
200.0
±5.1
161.0
±5.8
112.8
±3.7
Streams
Greedy +N
188.8
±12.7
140.6
±4.3
165.6
±6.7
145.8
±6.3
102.8
±3.4
Streams
Optimized
153.0
±9.34
81.8
±4.4
143.2
±8.6
124.4
±7.76
76.8
±3.4
Improvement
over Greedy
18.9% 41.8% 13.5% 14.7% 25.3%
Improvement
over 1:1
36.4% 63.1% 42.8% 35.9% 44.9%
longer than topological shortest paths. Our results are summarized in Table 4.1
along with 95% conﬁdence intervals. The top portion of the table shows the aver-
age node degree, total number of simple streams, total number of valid streams,
and the total number of streams actually used in the ILP. For the ARPANET
and COST network, we utilize the Q-stream heuristic to reduce the number of
streams using only 5% and 2% of the total number of valid streams respectively.
The lower portion of the results table ﬁrst show the capacity cost for provisioning
primary paths only, followed by cost for using dedicated path protection, online
greedy Streams with shortest backup path only and arbitrarily long backup paths
(shown for reference only using algorithm presented in [64]). The results for greedy
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Streams are obtained by taking 30 random demands in routing them in random
orderings, provisioning streams that greedily minimize cost. The results are av-
eraged over 50 random orderings for each of the 30 random demands. Finally,
capacity cost for using ILP optimized Streams is shown along with the amount of
improvement over the greedy approach as well as the improvement over dedicated
protection. The results for ARPANET and COST networks are obviously not
optimal (given utilization of only 5% and 2% of the available streams), but our
heuristic is eﬃcient in that it allows the ILP solver to ﬁnd good solutions that are
comparable to improvements shown in other networks. Overall, it shows that a
signiﬁcant savings in capacity cost can be achieved using the technique presented
in this thesis.
4.5 Summary
Most survivability algorithms developed for optically opaque networks are not
readily applicable to all-optical networks and result in lower eﬃciency due to
added limitations such as the λ-continuity constraint. The Streams algorithm is
attractive because it can be readily implemented in existing networks and can co-
exist with algorithms such as SPP and DPP without additional hardware support
and with a small management overhead.
Our results show that the Streams algorithm is eﬃcient in terms of capacity
usage, allowing us to meet the goal of designing low loss survivability techniques
that are capacity-eﬃcient. The Streams algorithm’s recovery speed and data
loss characteristics are identical to 1:1 DPP, but is signiﬁcantly more eﬃcient in
utilizing available wavelengths. Therefore, it oﬀers an attractive tradeoﬀ between
recovery speed, data loss and capacity utilization. Furthermore, we also showed
that Streams can be applied to oﬄine provisioning scenarios with known, static
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traﬃc demands using ILP solutions as well as heuristics to achieve higher eﬃciency
in capacity usage.
The bottom line is that Streams can be used instead of 1:1 protection to
achieve the same level of recovery speed while signiﬁcantly reducing capacity cost
or blocking probability.
There are couple interesting questions, though outside the scope of this work,
that stem from our work. To evaluate and compare diﬀerent protection schemes, in
addition to the fundamental tradeoﬀs covered in this work, it may be interesting to
experiment with how well these algorithms perform under diﬀerent types of failure
models, such as multiple failures. It may also be interesting to study the impact
of online re-optimization techniques for backup capacity, but it may signiﬁcantly
increase management overhead for any protection scheme.
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CHAPTER 5
Impact of Physical Layer Impairments
on Reliability
As discussed in motivating the need for a high-speed recovery protocol such as the
Streams algorithm presented in the previous chapter, all-optical networks (AON)
oﬀer several critical advantages over optically opaque networks. Higher data rates
can be achieved with the absence of electronic and photonic processing delays that
can act as a bottleneck on the total transmission time. Unlike networks that uti-
lize optical-electronic-optical (OEO) conversion, AONs can handle signals with
diﬀerent data rates, protocols, and formats, allowing ﬂexibility in architectures
that are capable of supporting changes in today’s standards [23, 63]. However,
they suﬀer from non-ideal physical transmission and component characteristics,
which bounds the network performance. A number of transmission impairments
that AONs are susceptible to include signal degradation, ampliﬁed spontaneous
emission (ASE) noise, gain saturation and crosstalk. A few of the factors con-
tributing to signal degradation in AONs include ﬁber attenuation losses, switch
and mux/demux insertion losses and tap losses. In order to compensate for the
signal degradation caused by these losses, ampliﬁers are utilized to boost the sig-
nal strength to a level where it can be successfully detected by photodetectors
within the network. The use of erbium-doped ﬁber ampliﬁers (EDFA) to boost
signal levels, however, also causes the generation of ASE noise that accumulates
along a lightpath with every ampliﬁcation. Another impairment brought on by
the use of EDFAs is that of gain saturation. As the strength of the signal increases
the added gain of the EDFA saturates to a lower amount lending to further sig-
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nal degradation as the signal traverses the network. In traversing the network,
multiple signals cross paths in a switching node where they can interfere with
each other and generate crosstalk. All of the above mentioned transmission im-
pairments adversely aﬀect the bit error rate (BER) of connections and become a
bottleneck in network performance [72].
Various performance studies along with novel routing schemes under physical
impairments in AONs can be found in the literature [73, 74, 75, 76]. To avoid sig-
niﬁcant drops in signal to noise ratios (SNR), connections are spaced out across
the network to better optimize against crosstalk and improve blocking perfor-
mance. A performance study using BER estimation for all candidate connections
is presented in [73]. To reduce the computation time during online, dynamic pro-
visioning, a crosstalk component counting technique is proposed in [74]. Using
the outcome of this weighted counting technique, BER estimation is performed
once per connection request, signiﬁcantly reducing provisioning overhead. In [75],
a simple and eﬃcient wavelength ordering technique is proposed to improve QoT
unaware routing blocking probability.
Transmission impairment issues, coupled with the fact that the impact of
failures in AONs is exacerbated by their high traﬃc volumes, necessitate an un-
derstanding of how survivability algorithms are aﬀected by non-ideal QoT param-
eters. With the extremely high volume of traﬃc carried on wavelength division
multiplexed (WDM) networks, failures such as ﬁber cuts can result in a loss of
huge amounts of data and revenue. In order to maintain high quality services
for future communication needs, we must be able to guarantee a desired level of
robustness. The problems with utilizing protection schemes under physical layer
impairments are two-fold. With traditional, QoT unaware protection schemes,
backup paths may not meet the BER requirements when they are activated. In
addition, activating backup paths can increase the BER on other connections
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that have not been directly aﬀected by the link failure. To quantify these phe-
nomenons, we introduce two metrics namely QoT vulnerability and Cascading
Failure Probability. In [77], optimization and heuristic techniques for maximizing
resource sharing for shared path protection for non-dynamic network with sparse
OEO conversion was presented. In [78], dynamic AON performance under two
dedicated path protection schemes (as later described in Chapter 1) was studied
(in terms of both blocking and the probability of connections not meeting the
QoT requirements after a failure).
We present diﬀerent QoT aware schemes based on dedicated path protection
(SPP) and shared path protection (SPP). We then compare the various meth-
ods in terms of call blocking, QoT vulnerability and cascading failure probability.
Our results show that, in general, blocking performance of QoT aware provisioning
with protection is close to QoT aware unprotected provisioning scenarios. Under
ideal conditions, blocking performance of routing protected connections can be
anywhere from 50% to over 100% worse than routing unprotected connections.
However, to guarantee 100% survivability, a more constrained routing and wave-
length assignment (RWA) technique must be used and our results show that a
considerable more calls must be rejected.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: First, the underlying network
architecture, various sources of transmission impairments, and how they all af-
fects survivability is presented next. Second, the metrics used for performance
evaluation along with the techniques used for protection routing are presented
in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 summarizes the physical layer models used in this
work. Simulation results are provided in Section 5.4 followed by a summary and
discussion on future directions in Section 5.5.
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5.1 Network Architecture, Crosstalk, and
Survivability in AONs
Tap Tap
λ1
λΝ
Fiber
PD (Rx)Laser (Tx)
FiberEDFAEDFA
Demux Mux
NxN Banyan
Switch
Figure 5.1: AON Node architecture.
In this section, we discuss the underlying network architecture and various
sources of impairments that adversely aﬀect the overall QoT. We then discuss
how it aﬀects end-to-end protection schemes and network survivability.
5.1.1 Network Model
The components that make up an AON are depicted in Figure 5.1. As shown
in the ﬁgure, lightpaths traversing through the network propagate through ﬁber
cables and nodes en route to their destination. The lightpaths originate from lasers
within the node through the modulation of signals from the electrical domain into
the optical domain and are sent to a destination where a photodetector converts
the received optical signal back into the electrical domain. As the signal travels
through ﬁber links on to its destination, it is subject to degradation due to ﬁber
attenuation loss brought on by imperfections, absorption and scattering eﬀects
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Figure 5.2: Strictly non-blocking 8x8 switch architecture built using 2x2 couplers.
The table shows the number of copies of NxN Banyan required to build a strictly
non-blocking switch. Three 8x8 Banyan crossconnect design is used to meet the
requirements of a strictly non-blocking switch. By design, the combiners and split-
ters before and after the core Banyans are disjoint among lightpaths. Therefore,
crosstalk (1st order) occurs only in the core.
within the ﬁber. At each node along the route, the signal passes through an
optical ﬁber tap and experiences an insertion loss. To make up for the combined
tap and ﬁber losses, an EDFA input gain is used to boost the signal strength before
the signal enters the switch where the signal is again subjected to additional losses.
The losses within the switch arise from demultiplexer and multiplexer insertion
losses as well as switch-size dependent insertion and coupling losses from the
switch. Upon exiting the switch, an additional EDFA output gain is applied to
the signal to help remedy these losses before the signal is sent through an optical
ﬁber tap and onto the next node in the path.
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Figure 5.2 illustrates the Banyan network used inside 8x8 switch for each
wavelength. In order for the Banyan architecture to be strictly non-blocking
(a path exists through the switch from all open in-ports to all open out-ports),
multiple planes or copies must be utilized. In [79], the exact number of planes
required for various switch sizes is presented. The table in the ﬁgure shows the
number of planes required to build a strictly non-blocking switch and a crosstalk-
free switch (no two paths share a 2x2 coupler) for the node sizes found in the
network topologies used in this work.
5.1.2 Crosstalk Model
The two types of crosstalk that can occur in optical crossconnects are in-band
crosstalk and out-band crosstalk. The latter type of crosstalk occurs between sig-
nals of diﬀerent wavelengths and outside the passband of an optical ﬁlter, thereby
allowing it’s harmful eﬀects to be mitigated through the employment of narrow-
band optical ﬁlters. In-band crosstalk, however, arises in switches from lightwaves
using similar wavelengths and can be either coherent or incoherent. Coherent
crosstalk occurs when the interfering signals are phase-correlated and incoherent
crosstalk occurs when the signals or not phase-correlated. Due to the uncorrelated
phase, incoherent crosstalk can have deleterious eﬀects on aﬀected signals.
LP1
LP2
Figure 5.3: Demux/mux crosstalk.
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As the eﬀects of out-band crosstalk can be reduced to acceptable levels, only in-
band crosstalk is considered in the work presented here. The two kinds of in-band
crosstalk that are considered include switch and demux/mux crosstalk. To reﬂect
the diﬀerent impacts of the kinds of crosstalk, weights are applied to each kind of
crosstalk based upon the switch channel isolation and port isolation characteristics
of the switching node. Switch crosstalk occurs as a result of power leakage between
the ports of switching modules while demux/mux crosstalk occurs as a result of
insuﬃcient adjacent-channel isolation. The former kind of crosstalk occurs when
a number of lightpaths, using the same wavelength, impart a portion of their
signal to each other as they pass through the switch. Demux/mux crosstalk can
occur in two diﬀerent ways. First, it can occur when lightpaths using diﬀerent
wavelengths ingress and egress using the same ports. As ﬁgure 5.3 depicts, when
lightpaths LP1 and LP2 pass through the same demultiplexer they interfere and
impart a portion of their signal onto each other only to have the leaked signal
portion imparted back onto themselves in the form of crosstalk as the signals
traverse through the same multiplexer. With this type of crosstalk, the resulting
crosstalk might be coherent because the original signal is interfering with itself.
However, as the signal traverses through the node, varying propagation delays
can bring about eﬀects similar to those of incoherent crosstalk [80]. As with [74]
we simplify our model by considering all instances of this type of crosstalk to be
incoherent as they make up a small portion of all crosstalk.
Another mechanism that generates demux/mux crosstalk follows a similar
mechanism and diﬀers in one aspect, i.e. the signal generating the crosstalk.
In this circumstance, signals utilizing diﬀerent wavelengths interfere with each
other while passing through demultiplexers. On passing through multiplexers in
the node, they will generate incoherent in-band crosstalk when interfering with
signals that use the same frequency as the signal they previously interfered with.
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5.1.3 Ampliﬁer Spontaneous Emission Noise
As mentioned earlier, optical signals propagating through the network are subject
to losses from a variety of network components. In order to compensate for these
losses, ampliﬁers are placed within the network to boost the signal strength. A side
eﬀect of optically amplifying signals, however, is the accumulation of ASE noise
which is generated with every ampliﬁcation thereby posing a limit to the beneﬁts
of performing signal ampliﬁcation. The expression for ASE noise power [72] is
given by
Pn = 2nsphν(G− 1)Bo (5.1)
In the expression above nsp is the spontaneous emission factor, h is Planck’s
constant, ν is the optical frequency (where ν = c/λ and c is the speed of light)
and Bo is the optical ﬁlter bandwidth. The generation and accumulation of ASE
noise within propagating signals therefore makes an additional consideration when
determining the BER of a lightpath.
5.1.4 Gain Saturation
Another source of transmission impairment from EDFA use comes in the form
of gain saturation where the output gain of the ampliﬁer varies depending upon
the level of the input optical signal. Lower signal power levels input into the
ampliﬁer induce a gain level close to the small signal gain of the ampliﬁer while
higher levels of input induce saturated gain levels. Due to the saturated gain of
the EDFA the optical signal does not fully recover from the losses it is subject to
while traversing the network.
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5.1.5 QoT and Survivability
Given a realistic network model with physical layer impairments such ASE noise
and various types of crosstalk, protection schemes can degrade and may not
achieve 100% failure recovery. When a network link fails, the backup paths of the
connections aﬀected by the failure become active and start to interfere with exist-
ing connections. As the newly activated connections induce additional crosstalk,
several problems arise. The example shown in Figure 5.4 illustrates how a new
source of crosstalk (that did not exist during normal operation) is introduced. In
this example, there are two primary paths each with a backup path—P1 − B1
and P2 − B2. They are allocated on λ1. During normal operation, B1 and B2
are not active and have no impact on transmission. After link (0, 1) fails, P1 is
turned oﬀ and B1 becomes active. In the switch at node 2, crosstalk is introduced
between P2 and B1 as both lightpaths cross the same coupler at the last stage
of the Banyan. Crosstalk induced by switching from primary to backup paths
can generally lead to two problems. First, the backup path’s BER can be too
high resulting in an unsuccessful recovery (we term this eﬀect QoT Vulnerability).
Second, existing primary paths that are unaﬀected by the link failure can also fail
due to newly introduced crosstalk (we term this Cascaded Failure). Two metrics
that quantify these eﬀects are introduced and discussed in Section 5.2.1.
Protection paths are generally also more sensitive to transmission impairments.
Depending on the network topology, selecting alternate paths for protection re-
quires the use of longer paths (in terms of hops). First, longer paths can be
a problem as more ampliﬁcation is required inducing additional ASE noise cou-
pled with eﬀects of EDFA saturation. Longer paths are also more susceptible
to crosstalk as it crosses more nodes and is more likely to experience crosstalk
leading to higher QoT Vulnerability as well as Cascaded Failures.
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Figure 5.4: Crosstalk is introduced in the switch between primary path P2 and
the backup path B1 when B1 is turned on after the link failure.
5.2 QoT and Protection
Dedicated path protection (DPP) and shared path protection (SPP) are two of
the most commonly used end-to-end survivability schemes. There are many other
protection schemes that oﬀer various tradeoﬀs suited to ﬁll diﬀerent needs of the
network. However, DPP and SPP represent the two ends of the spectrum in the
critical tradeoﬀ between recovery speed and capacity usage. DPP oﬀers SONET
ring-like recovery, while SPP has been shown to signiﬁcantly reduce operation cost
in terms of capacity. In dynamic networks this reduction in capacity equates to
the ability to support higher loads at the same level of call blocking. We use DPP
and SPP schemes to study the impact of physical layer impairments on survivable
optical networks. First we introduce two metrics that allows us to capture the
post-failure impact of non-ideal physical layer characteristics that are not present
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in OEO networks. We then present various approaches to performing protection
routing under with QoT consideration.
5.2.1 Metrics
QoT-Vulnerability (VQoT ) measures the likelihood of experiencing incomplete fail-
ure recovery due to transmission impairments (despite the fact that a protection
schemes is used to provide 100% recovery from all single link failures). Given that
we are studying protection schemes (where the network is designed to survive all
single link failures), it is more interesting to see how often the network cannot
achieve complete recovery rather than measuring the recovery ratio (more useful
for measuring restoration techniques where capacity is limited or possibly multiple
failure scenarios). It is deﬁned as
VQoT =
1
|E|
|E|∑
i
fb(i) (5.2)
where fb(i) is deﬁned as
fb(i) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 all live backup paths meet BER requirements
after failure of link i.
1 otherwise
(5.3)
Cascaded Failure Probability is deﬁned as the probability of connections (that
are not directly aﬀected by a network failure) failing because of the increase in
BER due to crosstalk induced by activating backup paths of other connections.
It can be computed by using the following formula, similar to VQoT .
Vcas =
1
|E|
|E|∑
i
fp(i) (5.4)
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where fb(i) is deﬁned as
fp(i) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 all live primary paths meet BER requirements
after failure and recovery of link i.
1 otherwise
(5.5)
In this work, we assume equal likelihood of link failures, but the metric can
easily be adapted given speciﬁc failure rates for each link by simply factoring in
coeﬃcients for each link. Note that the change in failure rates does not aﬀect the
contribution of this work. Further studies incorporating speciﬁc failure rates for
speciﬁc networks may be interesting, but is outside the scope of this work.
Another metric commonly used to study survivability is failure ratio (or re-
covery ratio = 1 - failure ratio). This metric is used to study restoration schemes
or failure scenarios not covered by the protection model to quantify the impact
of such failures (for example, multiple failures). Given that we are dealing with
protection schemes, it is much more critical to understand whether or not, and
how likely a network is unable to perform as designed (100% survivability, espe-
cially given that a signiﬁcant cost overhead is incurred to build protection schemes
into the network) rather than studying how much of the network can be restored.
However, we use the failure ratio metric to understand how well a network can
do without utilizing a QoT-guaranteed protection scheme. Failure ratio is deﬁned
as the ratio between the number of connections that are not recovered due to
high BER to the number of connections that are aﬀected by a link failure. It is
averaged over all single link failures.
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Figure 5.5: Call admission process. (* RWA is performed according to the diﬀerent
algorithms described in this section.)
5.2.2 Algorithms
Figure 5.5 illustrates the online call admission process. Upon arrival of a con-
nection request, RWA is performed according to the various QoT-based methods
described later in this section. If the chosen path is not available on the selected
wavelength, the call is blocked. Otherwise, we enumerate through each lightpath
in the network to estimate the BER. If the BER of any lightpath does not meet the
minimum requirement, the call is rejected. In non QoT-guaranteed schemes, all
primary lightpaths are tested. The method used for the QoT-Guaranteed scheme
is described later in this section. If the BER requirement is met for all tested
lightpaths, the call is admitted.
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In selecting paths, both DPP and SPP require the use of link-disjoint paths
for the primary and backup paths. We utilize shortest topological primaries and
shortest backup paths (disjoint from the primary). This is a very well understood
topic and more details can be found in [10]. Given multiple path and wavelength
choices, we perform RWA according to the techniques described below.
• QoT Aware, Unprotected (Unp) - We perform RWA for unprotected
connections to show how much blocking performance changes when sur-
vivability is introduced. We use a crosstalk counting technique to select
the path that is more likely to pass the BER requirements. Each type of
crosstalk components are counted on each candidate path and a candidate
wavelength and the path-wavelength pair with the minimum weight is cho-
sen. If none of the wavelengths are available, the connection is blocked. Note
that each crosstalk component is weighted according to the port and switch
isolation parameters using the technique introduced in [74]. Candidate se-
lection is done randomly among equally weighted choices. Once the best
candidate is found, BER estimation is performed on all existing connections
(in addition to the new connection) that are aﬀected by the introduction of
the new connection to see if they all meet the BER requirements. The call
is rejected if any of the tested connections fail the BER test.
• QoT Unaware (QoT-UA) - RWA is performed for each DPP and SPP
without consideration for QoT. The goal for SPP here is to minimize ca-
pacity usage by maximizing sharing. We greedily select the minimum cost
path and wavelength using a method consistent with previous work found
in the literature [19]. If no wavelengths are available, the call is blocked.
Otherwise, BER estimation is done on the primary path only (similar to
unprotected case described above).
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• QoT Aware (QoT-A) - RWA is performed similar to the technique used
for Unp for the primary paths. Once the best primary is selected, backup
paths are chosen diﬀerently for DPP and SPP. For DPP, the corresponding
backup path is selected using random placement among available paths and
wavelengths. For SPP, backup paths are chosen to minimize the use of new
wavelength allocation similar to QoT-UA. If there are more than one mini-
mum “cost” backup paths, it is randomly chosen. The ﬁnal call admission
using the BER estimation process is the same as in QoT-UA.
In addition, at each node in each path-wavelength combination, we select the
copy of the Banyan plane (refer to Figure 5.2) that has the minimum number
of crosstalk. Depending on the switch size, several planes exist allowing us
to choose the best one. Again, if multiple, equal “cost” options exit, we
choose randomly. For both DPP and SPP, note that the Banyan plane
selection is done upfront during the RWA stage for both the primary and
the backup path. Note that recovery protocol for SPP requires signaling of
the intermediate nodes along the path to conﬁgure the switch before sending
out the data over the backup path. Taking advantage of this process, we
can select the best Banyan plane if and when there is a failure, as the
intermediate nodes are reconﬁgured in an attempt to reduce crosstalk.
• QoT Guaranteed (QoT-G) - Finally, in order to guarantee 100% sur-
vivability, we must consider all single-link failure cases. BER requirements
must be met by all connections, under all single-link failures. As with QoT
aware primary path selection, BER estimation on all possible backup paths
are avoided by using a method similar to crosstalk component counting
used above. We extend this approach for backup paths as follows. For each
backup candidate, all link failure scenarios are enumerated and the number
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Figure 5.6: Crosstalk counting for potential backup path selection for SPP. All
possible failure cases must be enumerated. One case shown: link (1,2).
of crosstalk possible in each scenario is counted. We then select the candi-
date with the minimum number. Figure 5.6 illustrates this method. Two
connections P1 and P2 are already on the network with the corresponding
backup paths. We are trying to route P3 and B3. The candidate backup,
B3, is on λ1. Given that P1 and P3 do not fail at the same time, the
wavelength on link (5,4) can be shared with B1 for SPP. The bottom part
of the ﬁgure shows where crosstalk can occur when the potential failure of
link (1, 2) is considered. P1, B2 and B3 are active, and the various crosstalk
sources can be counted. Once the best candidate is chosen, we move on to
the BER estimation step.
A path is represented as a set of links in the graph
E - set of all links in the graph
R(i) - set of all connections on the network, where p ∈ R(i), i ∈ p
R′(i) - set of all connections on the network, where p ∈ R′(i), i /∈ p
BER(i, λ) - function returns the estimated BER for path i on λ
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Check backup path b on λ:
1: for all e ∈ E do
2: for all i ∈ R(e) do
3: remove i.primary
4: if BER(b, λ) < threshold then
5: reject call and stop
6: for all i ∈ R(e) do
7: if BER(i.backup, i.λb) < threshold then
8: reject call and stop
9: for all i ∈ R′(e) do
10: if BER(i.primary, i.λb) < threshold then
11: reject call and stop
12: accept call
For each failed link, we can divide the network into two types of connections—
failed connections and connections unaﬀected by the link failure. For each
failed connection, we add the backup paths to the BER estimation engine.
For the unaﬀected connection, we add the primary paths to the same engine.
BER estimation is then performed on all connections. If any connection does
not meet the BER requirements, the call is rejected. The above algorithm
illustrates how this step is enumerated given a chosen backup path and an
available wavelength. Overall BER estimation is performed |E| times more
compared to QoT-A.
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5.3 Physical Layer Model
5.3.1 Signal, Crosstalk and Noise Power
From earlier discussions, it is apparent that there are three components to the
propagating signal that need to be addressed when considering the BER, i.e. the
desired signal, crosstalk and ASE noise. The eﬀects of the three components are
also shaped by the ampliﬁer gains and various losses the signal goes through while
traversing the network. The accumulated gains and losses, AGL, that the optical
signal witnesses enroute to node i can be expressed as such
AGL(i) = Lf (i− 1, i)LtapGin(i)Ldm(i)Lsw(i)
·Lmx(i)Gout(i)Ltap
(5.6)
where the Lx and Gx terms in the above equation represent, respectively, losses
and gains from the taps, ﬁber, demultiplexer, multiplexer and EDFAs. Using this
equation, the powers of the propagating signal components Psig(i), crosstalk Pxt(i)
and ASE noise Pase(i) at the output of the ith intermediate node can be realized
by the following equations:
Psig(i) = Psig(i− 1)AGL(i) (5.7)
Pxt(i) = Pxt(i− 1)AGL(i)
+
∑Ji
j=1 XswPin(j, i)Lsw(i)Lmx(i)
+
∑Ki
k=1 XmdPin(k, i)Lmx(i)
(5.8)
Pase(i) = Pase(i− 1)AGL(i) + 2nsp[Gin(i)− 1]h
·νiBoLdm(i)Lsw(i)Lmx(i)Gout(i)Ltap
+2nsp[Gout(i)− 1]hνiBoLtap
(5.9)
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The ﬁrst term of equation (5.8) accounts for crosstalk being accumulated as
the signal traverses the lightpath. The second and third terms on the other
hand describe the crosstalk generated within the node where Pin(j, i) and Pin(k, i)
represent the powers of each of the Ji and Ki signals that are sources of switch
and demux/mux crosstalk, respectively, within the switch. Xsw represents the
switch crosstalk ratio while Xmd signiﬁes the mux/demux crosstalk ratio. In
the expression for Pase(i), the ﬁrst term also accounts for the accumulated ASE
noise throughout the lightpath while the second term describes the ASE noise
contribution of the in-gain, Gin, and the third term does the same for the out-
gain, Gout, contribution within the current node.
EDFA Gain Model
In order to provide realism to the ampliﬁers used in the node models, the use
of ideal ampliﬁers was abandoned in favor of using ampliﬁers susceptible to gain
saturation and noise generation. The expression for the ASE noise generated by
the ampliﬁer is given by equation (5.1) where gain values for the in-gain, Gin, and
the out-gain, Gout, ampliﬁers are based on a black box EDFA model from [81].
The gain model used in this work is expressed as
G =
Go
1 +
(
Pin
Psat
)α (5.10)
where Go is the small-signal gain, Pin is the input signal power, Psat is the output
saturation power and α is a parameter used for adjusting the gain saturation. The
small signal gain values for the input ampliﬁers of each node were chosen to oﬀset
switch losses, Lsw, for the 4x4, 8x8 and 16x16 switches used in the simulation
while small signal gain for output ampliﬁers was kept constant at 22 dB to oﬀset
ﬁber link (Lf) and tap (Ltap) losses. Values for Psat, the output power where the
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gain falls 3 dB, and α where chosen to mimic features of the EDFA gain model
used by the authors of [73].
5.3.2 Bit Error Rate
The signal, crosstalk and ASE noise powers received at the photodetectors in the
network are used to calculate the Bit Error Rate of the lightpath at the respective
node and to determine if the lightpath can successfully deliver a signal. The
calculated BER at the photodetector is compared to a threshold and call requests
that fail to meet the threshold are subsequently blocked. BER calculations in our
simulation are done on a per call basis and carried out only if a call has not been
blocked due to wavelength availability. The received powers within each node
come from lightwaves impinging upon the photodetectors of the node. A simple
expression for a lightwave used by the authors of [73] is given by
ER(t) = Acos(2πνit + θ(t)) + Ext(t) + Ease(t) (5.11)
The Ext(t) and Ease(t) terms of the expression represent the contributions of
crosstalk and ASE, respectively. The ﬁrst term represents the signal contribution
of the lightwave where νi is the frequency, A is the amplitude and θ(t) denotes
the phase of the signal. The photocurrent produced by the impinging lightwave,
ER(t), can be expressed as:
ip(t) = Rλ〈E2R(t)〉+ ish(t) + ith(t) (5.12)
In the expression above (given by [73]), the shot noise contribution from the
lightwave is represented by ish(t) and the thermal noise contribution of the pho-
todetector is denoted by ith(t). The responsivity of the photodetector is Rλ , and
Rλ〈E2R(t)〉 is the square-and-average response of the photodetector for the given
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lightwave, ER(t). This term can also be expressed as the sum of the desired signal
and contributions from crosstalk and ASE beat noise components,
Rλ〈E2R(t)〉 = is(t) + isx(t) + issp(t)
+ ixx(t) + ispsp(t) + ixsp(t)
(5.13)
The ﬁrst term, is(t), represents the desired signal contribution. The beat noise
between the signal and crosstalk is denoted by isx(t), signal and ASE by issp(t),
crosstalk and itself by ixx(t), ASE and itself by ispsp(t) and crosstalk and ASE by
ixsp(t). Combining all the noise terms, equation (5.13) can be written as
ip(t)= Isi + ni(t) (5.14)
= RλPsig(N, λ) + ni(t) (5.15)
The i subscripts in equations (5.14) and (5.15) can have a value of either ’0’
or ’1’, indicating the data bit being received by the photodetector. The summed
Gaussian noise components of the combined electrical noise, ni(t), can be ex-
pressed as
σ2i = σ
2
th + σ
2
sh + σ
2
sgsp + σ
2
sgxt
+ σ2spsp + σ
2
xtxt + σ
2
spxt
(5.16)
where the individual variances are given by
σ2sgsp = 4RIsiPaseBe/Bo (5.17)
σ2spsp = I
2
siP
2
aseBe(2Bo −Be)/(PsigBo)2 (5.18)
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σ2sgxt = 2ξRIsiPxt (5.19)
σ2xtxt =
1
4
R2si
∑
i>j
Pxt,iPxt,j (5.20)
σ2spxt =
4
Bo
R2BePase
Nxt∑
i=1
Pxt,i (5.21)
σ2sh = 2qRBe(Pxt + Pase + Isi/R) (5.22)
σ2th = I
2
thBe (5.23)
In the expressions above, Ith is the receiver thermal noise current, q is the
charge of an electron, Nxt is the number of crosstalk components, Be is the elec-
tronic bandwidth, ξ(= 1/2 see [82]) is the polarization mismatch factor between
the signal and crosstalk lightwaves and Pxt,i is the crosstalk power of the ith
crosstalk component.
Assuming an ideal extinction ratio and an optimum photocurrent decision
threshold for minimizing the BER, the Q factor can be used to provide an esti-
mation of the BER. The expression for the Q factor is given by
Q =
I1 − I0
σ1 + σ0
(5.24)
where σ0 and σ1 represent the noise values (from equation (5.16)) and I0 and
I0 are the received photocurrent values when the received data bit is 0 or 1,
respectively. The Q factor is related to the BER through the expression
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BER =
1
2
erfc
(
Q√
2
)
≈ e
−Q2/2
Q
√
2π
(5.25)
where a Q factor of 7 translates to a BER of 10−12
Table I
System Model Parameters
Parameter Values
Wavelengths (1546.99, 1547.80,1548.60 1549.40
1550.20, 1551.00, 1551.80, 1552.60)
Electronic Bandwidth (Be) 10 GHz
Optical Bandwidth (Bo) 50 GHz
Switch element insertion loss (Ls) 1 dB
Waveguide/ﬁber coupling loss (Lw) 1 dB
Switch loss (Lsw) 2log2NLs + 4Lw dB∗
Tap loss (Ltap) 1 dB
Fiber loss (Lf ) 0.2 dB/km
Input EDFA Gain (Gin) 22 dB
Output EDFA Gain (Gout) 16 dB, 18 dB, 20 dB
Multiplexer loss (Lmx) 4 dB
Demultiplexer loss (Ldm) 4 dB
ASE factor (nsp) 1.41
RMS thermal noise current (Ith) 3.8 x 10−12 Amp
Switch crosstalk ratio (Xsw) 20 dB
Mux/demux crosstalk ratio (Xdm) 30 dB
Planck’s constant (h) 6.626 x 10−34
Rx responsivity (R) 0.95 Amp/W
Max. laser Power (Pt) 1 mW
Q factor threshold (qth) 7
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5.4 Simulation and Results
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Figure 5.7: 15N-Mesh and NJLATA.
We use two well-known networks (shown in Figure 5.7) to illustrate the ideas
discussed in this work. The 15N-Mesh network has 15 nodes and 21 links and
the NJLATA network has 11 nodes and 23 links. We assume that each link con-
sists of two ﬁbers in opposite directions. We use the link lengths of 100km each,
which is consistent with previous work found in the literature [73, 83, 75]. We
assume Poisson arrivals of calls (connection requests for lightpaths) with expo-
nential holding times. Connection requests are uniformly distributed among all
network node pairs with 1 unit capacity. As shown in the network architecture,
we assume a wavelength conversion-free network. Table X lists the parameters
used for our simulations.
Our measurements are performed as follows. For each data point in our graphs,
we average 100 simulation runs. For each simulation run, we route 20,000 calls for
warm-up. Then, we route windows of 5,000 connections. Blocking probabilities
in two consecutive windows are compared and the simulation is stopped when
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this diﬀerence reaches 5% or less. In our experiments, the total number of calls
ranged from 40,000 to 120,000 before stopping using this technique. To measure
the impact of link failures, after we stop the simulator using the above method,
we simulate failures of all links, one by one. We then continue the simulation
until all existing connections have departed, and route another 1000 connections
before taking measurements again. This process is repeated 50 times for each of
the 100 runs. In other words, blocking probability is averaged over 100 runs, and
VQoT and Vcas are measured over the same 100 runs with 50 measurements within
each run.
In performing RWA, we utilize topological shortest paths for primary paths and
shortest possible paths that are link-disjoint from the primary paths for backup.
All possible shortest primary and backup path pairs are considered.
5.4.1 15N-Mesh
Figures 5.8 to 5.9 show blocking probability, VQoT and Vcas for DPP and SPP
on the 15N-Mesh network. First, the well-known trend between DPP and SPP
in terms of blocking performance holds true in AONs, i.e.SPP has signiﬁcantly
lowered blocking across the various algorithms used in this work.
The QoT aware algorithms perform fairly close to the ideal case because the
backup paths become “buﬀers” between primary paths. As a result, wavelength
blocking dominates call rejection due to low BER when using QoT-aware algo-
rithms. In DPP, more wavelength channels are reserved for backup, which results
in closer to ideal performance compared to SPP. Also note that using DPP, the
network can only support up to about 14 Erlangs under the ideal scenario if over-
all blocking is kept below a reasonable range (about 5%). SPP can support up to
about 20 Erlangs.
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Figure 5.8: 15N-Mesh DPP.
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Figure 5.9: 15N-Mesh SPP.
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It is also easy to notice that the QoT aware algorithms perform much better
than the QoT unaware algorithms. Also, because the demux/mux crosstalk is the
dominating factor (vs. switch crosstalk), there is a bigger merit in using the QoT
aware algorithms compared to utilizing the Xsw-free architecture. The blocking
probability for QoT-guaranteed protection is considerably higher as expected.
When the load is very low however (below 6), the network is empty enough to
allow QoT-G algorithm to perform slightly better than the random placement in
QoT unaware algorithms.
As the load increases (and more of the network is utilized), QoT Vulnerabil-
ity for QoT Aware algorithms becomes worse than their unaware counterparts.
The two QoT aware algorithms are designed to route a connection by avoiding
other primary paths to avoid crosstalk. This procedure places the primary paths
alongside/next to either empty channels or backup (non-active) paths. The likeli-
hood of placement next to a backup path increases as the network load increases.
The QoT unaware algorithms suﬀer from high blocking and has less connections
sitting on the network at the same load level and our results show that random
placement in QoT unaware algorithms performs relatively well.
With cascading failures, QoT aware algorithms perform better than QoT un-
aware algorithms because the primary paths are selected to minimize (albeit
greedily) crosstalk. Upon interference from backup paths, the primary paths
provisioned with QoT aware schemes are more likely to survive.
There are two reasons why the VQoT is much higher than Vcas. First, the post-
failure BER for primary paths can only get worse by introducing crosstalk from
an activated backup path. On the other hand, backup paths can interfere with
each other as they are activated. Second, the average path lengths for primary
paths is much shorter compared to that of the backup paths (about 2.4 vs. 4.0).
Therefore, the BER on primary paths are much lower compared to backup paths,
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and the impact of crosstalk is more severe on the backup paths compared to
primary paths.
The lower vulnerability in DPP compared to SPP is simply due to the fact
that SPP accepts more connections at the same load level and therefore has more
potential crosstalk. Given that post-failure BER for backup paths go over the
threshold 10 to 40% of the time on average, QoT-guaranteed protection is required
to guarantee full link-failure recovery.
5.4.2 NJLATA
Figures 5.10 and 5.11 show the simulation results for NJLATA. The general trend
in blocking probability is similar to 15N-Mesh. The performance of QoT-G, how-
ever, is much better compared to 15N-Mesh. First, because NJLATA is more
well-connected, there are more path choices for each connection making NJLATA
more ﬂexible and supportive of alternate routing choices. Second, the average
backup path length for NJLATA is around 2.3 compared to 4.0 for 15N-Mesh.
The average primary path lengths for NJLATA is around 1.8 compared to 2.4
for 15N-Mesh. Therefore, NJLATA’s primary and backup path pairs are more
resilient to signal degradation.
The QoT unaware algorithms outperform QoT aware algorithms in terms of
QoT vulnerability for NJLATA. Unlike 15N-Mesh, random placement of paths are
more acceptable at low loads due to the stronger SNR in NJLATA. QoT aware
algorithms’ lower blocking translates to more connections sitting on the network,
but at higher loads, network utilization starts to increase. When the QoT aware
algorithms place primary paths away from each other, they are more likely to be
sitting next to a backup path causing higher increase in post-failure BER.
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Figure 5.10: NJLATA DPP.
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Figure 5.11: NJLATA SPP.
144
Note that VQoT for the various algorithms are closer in SPP compared to DPP.
As explained previously, primary paths in QoT aware algorithms are placed next
to backup paths to avoid crosstalk during normal operation. When diﬀerent a
set of backup paths are activated (in the event of a link failure), they aﬀect
the neighboring primary paths. Under SPP, each wavelength-channel reserved
for backup has a higher chance of being activated because they serve multiple
connections. Therefore, SPP’s unaﬀected primary paths and activated backup
paths are more likely to hit each other compared to DPP. At the same time,
SPP is able to accept more connections at the same load level compared to DPP.
Therefore, SPP has a higher level of crosstalk across the network compared to
DPP resulting in higher VQoT and Vcas.
5.4.3 Discussion
If less than, but close to, 100% recovery can be tolerated by the network, the
failure ratio metric can be very useful. It essentially quantiﬁes how much rerout-
ing is required. Figures 5.12a and 5.12b show the failure ratios for 15N-Mesh
and NJLATA networks. The overall trends are similar to that of VQoT . It shows,
however, that NJLATA is a good candidate network for utilizing QoT aware algo-
rithms instead of using QoT-G since the failure ratios are below 3% for DPP and
below 3.5% for SPP. 15N-Mesh has a high failure ratio and it is safe to assume
that rerouting up to 22% of the failed connections is unreasonable, especially in a
network that is designed with 100% single failure survivability in mind. Develop-
ing rerouting techniques for a small fraction of the connections that fail recovery
(as in NJLATA) can be explored, but is outside the scope of this work and left
for future work.
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Figure 5.12: a)FR for 15N-Mesh DPP(top) & SPP(bottom) b)FR for NJLATA
DPP(top) & SPP(bottom)
5.5 Summary
Transmission impairments such as ASE noise and crosstalk can determine the
ultimate performance of AONs. We showed that it also poses additional problems
for network survivability.
Simulation results showed that a network designed to survive failures using
protection schemes can experience failures with high probability due to a signiﬁ-
cant drop in the signal to noise ratio. We also showed that cascading failures can
occur. Utilizing QoT-guaranteed protection is the only way to insure complete
network protection, but suﬀers from higher call blocking. An alternative approach
to minimize this overhead was also presented. Our results showed that, while such
algorithms cannot guarantee 100% protection, depending on the topology, they
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may be useful if a small number of incomplete recovery is acceptable under the
reliability requirements. Various rerouting techniques from the literature can then
be applied to reestablish the broken connections.
The results also showed that, unlike previous studies where physical layer
constraints were not considered, increasing path lengths for shared protection
degrades performance. The length of paths used for backup are critical to network
robustness as longer hops lead to higher chance of crosstalk (which in turn aﬀects
other connections) in the event of a link failure. This problem is compounded with
the fact that such paths have weaker signals due to insuﬃcient compensation from
saturated ampliﬁers as well experiencing additional ASE noise.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and Future Directions
In this thesis, several critical areas in the design and management of optical
backbone networks with a focus on reliability was studied. As we become increas-
ingly dependent on reliable operation of computer networks, the role of survivable
backbone networks will become even more important. Given that many new ap-
plications require the ﬂexibility and scalability currently unavailable in the core
networks, several new interesting problems that are related to the topics covered in
this work arise. First, handling various kinds of failures (such as multiple failures)
is becoming more important. For example, future network planning in some cases
include the ability to handle three simultaneous or sequential failure scenarios.
The ability to eﬃciently manage network resources while meeting such stringent
requirements is challenging and will require better algorithms as well as more ef-
ﬁcient planning. To this end, providing cost-eﬃcient, rapid recovery for networks
also faces the same problem. We believe that the ability to properly provision the
network along with the ability to redimension the network based on traﬃc migra-
tion (or short-term need) will play a critical role in future network management.
We have studied such techniques for unprotected scenarios [84], but a better un-
derstanding is required to service protected networks as well as all-optical networks
with wavelength continuity constraints. Second, IP/WDM architectures relying
on diﬀerentiated protection mechanisms show the most promise for eﬃcient net-
work utilization. However, the impact of post-failure network performance under
such scenarios is not well understood. In [85] we show that rerouting connections
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that belong to best-eﬀort class, along with other classes of traﬃc, may suﬀer a sig-
niﬁcant increase in blocking without proper planning. A better understanding of
capacity planning is thus required to meet the needs of emerging architectures and
to implement various proposed methods for the IP/WDM architecture. Finally,
some interesting problems stem from studying the impact of physical layer im-
pairments on reliability. Currently, the beneﬁts of wavelength conversion in terms
of general network performance are well-understood. It allows a greater ﬂexibil-
ity in path-wavelength selection, but additional impairments can be introduced
by the wavelength conversion process. The next logical step is to investigate a
model that includes wavelength conversion along with protection algorithms that
leverage this ﬂexibility with the goal of achieving maximum network utilization.
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